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INTRODUCTION
Oil and gas development is testing and defining the boundaries of local
government authority and autonomy as concerned municipal entities and
citizens seek to limit oil and gas operations. Advances in high-volume
hydraulic fracturing have increased domestic oil and gas production to
historic levels.1 At the same time, national and international concerns about
irreversible man-made global warming have focused on fossil fuel
combustion.2 National groups opposed to continued reliance on oil and gas
as an energy source have found willing partners in many local governments
and their citizens, who are anxious about the local implications of drilling
and fracking.3 Many citizens and environmental organizations coalesce
around local environmental risks such as the potential degradation of ground
and surface waters and air quality, seismic activity, and social and economic
costs on the local area—including increased truck traffic, road damage,
noise, housing shortages, and boom and bust cycles.4 Particularly in urban
or suburban areas, voters may also perceive drilling and fracking as a threat
to property values, aesthetics, and lifestyles.

1. The United States has become the largest producer of petroleum and natural
gas in the world, surpassing Russia in natural gas production and Saudi Arabia in
oil production. See Adam Sieminski, Presentation, Oil and Gas Outlook 14 (Oct.
16, 2015), available at http://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/sieminski
_10162015.pdf [perma.cc/F2V7-TUD2].
2. See Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, WHITEHOUSE
.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change [perma.cc/2GGM-CMWK] (last
visited Dec. 27, 2015) (stating that carbon pollution is the biggest driver of climate
change).
3. See, e.g., Fracking: Community Defense, NRDC, http://www.nrdc.org/land
/fracking-community-defense/?gclid=Cj0KEQiAuremBRCbtr-1qJnKi-4BEiQAh0
x08G5Ia-q4N-5_wpQYvDYFWXlAtXaquuwKRYXZB2PpnUIaAjGB8P8HAQ
[perma.cc/72ZB-65D6] (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (“The Community Fracking
Defense Campaign brings the grassroots power of communities facing fracking
together with the expertise of NRDC’s policy and legal team.”).
4. For a discussion of various potential environmental risks and recommended
regulatory responses, see Hanna J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing
Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729 (2013).
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Now that fracking has become a topic of wider public interest, at least
to the media and the relatively informed public,5 local government efforts to
control oil and gas operations appear to be a modern phenomenon. These
recent efforts are, however, little more than “old wine in new bottles.” The
Cities of Winkfield and Oxford, Kansas, adopted municipal oil and gas
ordinances in the late 1920s that focused on the prevention of waste and the
protection of correlative rights,6 and cases that upheld the application of
zoning ordinances to oil and gas operations began appearing in the 1930s.7
Because neither fracking nor the local regulation of oil and gas
operations are particularly new,8 what has changed may be a matter of
degree. As advances in technology unlock new resources, drilling and
completion activities intensify in new areas that are rich in shale resources.9
5. Those who study oil and gas issues or work in related fields may be
particularly aware of the media coverage, but a 2013 study concluded that the
American populace is largely unaware of and undecided about hydraulic fracturing. See
Hilary Boudet et al., “Fracking” Controversy and Communication: Using National
Survey Data to Understanding Public Perceptions of Hydraulic Fracturing, 65 ENERGY
POL’Y 57, 63 (2014), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.10.017
[perma.cc/Z88X-VQEH].
6. See Bruce M. Kramer, The State of State and Local Government Relations
as It Impacts the Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations: Has the Shale Revolution
Really Changed the Rules of the Game?, 29 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 69, 71–
72 (2013).
7. See, e.g., Anderson-Kerr, Inc. v. Van Meter, 19 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Okla.
1933) (“The governing body of the city has a right to regulate the oil industry and
the drilling of wells within its corporate limits or to prohibit them from being
drilled in certain designated territory.”); Van Meter v. Westgate Oil Co., 32 P.2d
719, 721 (Okla. 1934).
8. Hydraulic fracturing, meaning the use of water to fracture rock
formations to produce oil and gas, “was first tested in 1903 and first used
commercially in 1948.” Thomas E. Kurth, Michael J. Mazzone, Mary S. Mendoza
& Christopher S. Kulander, American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, at 1,
3, NW. PRITZKER SCH. L. (2012), https://www.law.northwestern.edu/researchfaculty/searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Kulander_2012_Fracing_Paper.p
df [perma.cc/NN88-V7UA]. Horizontal drilling combined with slick-water
hydraulic fracturing at sufficient pressure to commercially produce shale and
other tight formations began around 1997 in the Barnett Shale, reinvigorating the
oil and gas industry. See J. Lanier Yeates & Andrew M. Abrameit, Current Issues
In Oil & Gas Shale Development, 58 ANN. INST. MIN. L. 146, 146 (2011).
9. See, e.g., Growth in U.S. Energy Production Outstrips Consumption Growth,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/pressroom/releases
/press379.cfm [perma.cc/D8SH-8EFX] (describing growth in oil production from
shale and other tight formations (Figure 1) and growth in shale gas production (Figure
3)).

812

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

While local governments have historically applied locational restrictions to
oil and gas operations under zoning ordinances,10 those governments now
more regularly seek to ban fracking or oil and gas production altogether.11
Many would not normally oppose local ordinances that require the use of a
closed loop system or reasonable set-backs.12 However, a complete ban on
hydraulic fracturing is extreme in the sense that it tends to eviscerate the oil
and gas interest owner’s ability to produce. In recent years, domestic oil and
gas production has focused on vast shale source rock and tight formations
that can be accessed only using hydraulic fracturing.13 As a result, a ban on
fracking is a relatively easy way to prohibit all oil and gas production
without expressly prohibiting oil and gas production.14
Furthermore, oil and gas drilling and fracking in Louisiana and
elsewhere challenge conservative Republican principles. Conservatism has
long promoted state-level governance over federal government power and
control.15 Under related principles, conservatives have advocated for local
10. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 73.
11. For a collection of more than 400 local ordinances related to oil and gas
operations or fracking, see Mary Grant, Local Resolutions Against Fracking, FOOD
& WATER WATCH (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight
/local-resolutions-against-fracking/ [perma.cc/3X2S-QCZ6]. The Author has not
verified that all of the collected ordinances have actually passed or are in full force
and effect.
12. A closed loop system is a system that allows an operator to drill a well without
using a reserve pit. Lance Astrella & Reginald Wiemers, Closed Loop Drilling
Systems Can Eliminate Reserve Pit Costs, O IL & G AS J. (May 27, 1996),
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-94/issue-22/in-this-issue/production/tech
nology-closed-loop-drilling-systems-can-eliminate-reserve-pit-costs.html [perma.cc
/S6D7-NKU9]. A setback for zoning purposes is a prescribed distance of a structure
from the property line or another structure. See Setback, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/setback [perma.cc/TMR2-U56C] (last
visited Jan. 3, 2016).
13. See Sieminski, supra note 1, at 4, 5.
14. David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing, 72
U. PITT. L. REV. 685, 686 (2011). Rather than prohibit fracking altogether, one
rather ingenious local regulation prohibited fracking with fluids other than fresh
water, which essentially makes advanced high-volume hydraulic fracturing
impossible. See SANTA FE CNTY., N.M., ORDINANCE 2008–19, § 11.25.4 (Dec.
10, 2008).
15. See Republican Party Platform of 1956, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25838 [perma.cc/4KAH-69KY] (last visited
Nov. 17, 2015) (“We hold that the strict division of powers and the primary
responsibility of State and local governments must be maintained, and that the
centralization of powers in the national Government leads to expansion of the mastery
of our lives.”); We The People: A Restoration of Constitutional Government, GOP,
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county and municipal self-governance over state governance.16 In
Louisiana, these local self-governance principles manifest in a home-rule
legal tradition.17 In recent years, however, this small government ideology
has been flipped on its head in more conservative states, such as Louisiana
and Texas, where urban areas lean Democratic and rural and suburban areas
tend to lean Republican, at least in state-wide elections.18
Modern conservatism not only promotes pushing government down
towards the people; it also strongly predicts support for fossil fuel
development.19 In the realm of oil and gas production, one may view the
state as more interested in securing jobs and promoting economic activity,20
https://www.gop.com/platform/we-the-people/ [perma.cc/PHV9-R9CG] (last visited
Nov. 17, 2015) (Republican Party Platform).
16. See, e.g., Platform-Local-Government, MONT. REPUBLICAN P ARTY,
http://www .mtgop.org/index.php/about/party-platform/212-platform-localgovernment.html [perma.cc/N2VC-LM3P] (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (“The
Montana Republican Party supports efforts to return control and authority to local
units, as the government closest and most responsive to the people.”).
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. The political makeup of Louisiana is somewhat of an anomaly. Although
Independents have made gains, Democrats still controlled about 73% of the
precincts in Louisiana in the 2012 presidential election, but 65% of those precincts
voted for republican candidate Mitt Romney for President. See Ben Myers,
Louisiana Votes Red Even as Democrats, Republicans Lose Sway, NOLA.COM (Nov.
4, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/11/louisiana_vo
ters_register_blue [perma.cc/8X25-XGMR]. As explained by Ed Chervenak, a
University of New Orleans political science professor, southern Democrats—
primarily white southern Democrats—in Louisiana have tended to remain registered
as Democrats even though voting habits have shifted towards the Republican Party
since Ronald Reagan first ran for President. Id.; see also Wade Goodwyn, New
Texas Governor Adds to Tension Between State, City Governments, NPR (Jan. 15,
2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/01/15/377526831/new-texas-governoradds-to-tension-between-state-city-governments [perma.cc/758H-USFS] (quoting
republican Texas Governor Greg Abbot as saying “[t]he truth is, Texas is being
California-ized with bag bans, fracking bans, tree-cutting bans” and noting “[t]he
cries that the new governor’s battle with his cities is the height of Republican
hypocrisy – ‘oh, sure, it’s all about local control until the Democrats are the ones in
control’”).
19. Hilary Boudet et al., supra note 5, at 60.
20. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 466–67 (2013)
(explaining capture theory, whereby business interests can capture the regulatory
process for their own benefit, and that agency capture may be more prevalent at
the state level (rather than the federal level) where the political process tends to
attract less attention).
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and local governments as more responsive to local environmental and social
concerns. While not all state governments necessarily under-regulate oil and
gas activities, perceptions lead to conflicts when communities view
themselves as entitled to a degree of local autonomy over activities such as
oil and gas development that conflict with state-wide interests. Part I of this
Article discusses the recent dispute over fracking in St. Tammany Parish as
a case study illustrating such a conflict.
Across the country, the relationship between state and local jurisdiction
over oil and gas drilling and completion is balanced along a spectrum. At
one extreme, the state regulates the process of drilling, but the local
government regulates land use with an absolute veto power to ban drilling.21
At the middle of the spectrum, the state regulates the process of drilling, and
the local government has the power to impose traditional zoning districts or
to impose setbacks on operations.22 However, in this situation, the local
government lacks an outright veto of drilling operations.23 The state may or
may not also provide additional opportunities for local governments to
participate in state permitting.24 Further along the spectrum, the state is the
final arbiter of both the process of drilling and the location of wells, but the
state provides an opportunity for meaningful participation by local
governments in the permitting process.25 Finally, at the other end of the
spectrum, the state is the final arbiter of both the process of drilling and the
location of wells.
As discussed in Part II of this Article, all major producing states, to
varying degrees, recognize the distinction between the state’s oversight of
the drilling process (“process”) and local government’s oversight of where
wells can be placed (“land use”). This distinction allocates control over the
process of drilling wells to the state while reserving some control over the
siting of wells to local governments. Even the new Texas and Oklahoma
21. New York and Pennsylvania are examples of this extreme. Ironically,
both states have express preemption statutes. See infra Part II.C.
22. Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma are examples of this
structure, see infra Part II, although land use control in Texas and Oklahoma
recently has been curtailed by new preemption statutes. See infra Part II.A–B.
Ohio also probably falls within this category despite an express preemption statute
that prohibits local regulation as to the location of wells. See infra Part II.C.
23. See infra Part II.C for the discussion of recent court decisions in Colorado
and New Mexico striking down bans on oil and gas operations.
24. Additional opportunities for local government participation in well
permitting decisions provided by Colorado are discussed in Part VI.A, infra.
25. This may be the new paradigm for Louisiana if its appellate courts
recognize the duties of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources under
Article IX, Section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution. See infra Part VI.B.
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preemption statutes, which were adopted in the wake of a Denton, Texas
fracking ban, leave some land use authority vested in local governments.26
In contrast, Louisiana operates at the far right of the spectrum. Louisiana
statutes and court decisions, which are examined in Part III of this Article,
deny local governments control over both process and land use decisions in
the oil and gas context.27
This lack of any local autonomy over the location of wells in Louisiana
arguably conflicts with the conservative ideal of home rule that the drafters
of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution envisioned.28 For a short period of time,
the Louisiana Supreme Court promised a new era of strong self-government
at the local level; however, the court quickly retreated from that promise in
favor of deference to the state legislature when state and local interests
collide.29 The implication is that, despite its purpose, home rule in Louisiana
provides little promise of local self-governance over oil and gas operations.
This premise is analyzed in Part IV of this Article.
Despite this lack of local control in Louisiana, Part V of this Article
argues as a normative matter that the state should have ultimate authority
over well siting decisions due to the nature of oil and gas. In particular, the
line between the state interest in process and land use blurs in the oil and gas
context. State conservation agencies have a statutory mandate to prevent
waste of minerals and protect the correlative rights of landowners that may
be compromised by bans or zoning ordinances that prohibit oil and gas
operations in particular locations.30 This is not, however, to say that local
environmental and other concerns should go unheeded.
Part VI of this Article examines two alternatives that ultimately give the
state authority over the location of wells. The first alternative— voluntary
compromise—only addresses substantive environmental concerns when the
parties feel compelled to negotiate. Even without a legal mandate, however,
the oil and gas industry may negotiate restrictions on its operations to
preserve or enhance its social license to operate when the risks and costs of
compliance are perceived as low. The second alternative is examined in the
context of the recent victory by the Town of Abita Springs in its dispute with
the state over fracking in St. Tammany Parish.31 This alternative recognizes
the obligations of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”)
as a public trustee under the “Natural Resources Article,” Article IX, Section
26. See infra Part II.A–B for discussion of the new Texas and Oklahoma
preemption statutes.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. LA. CONST. art. VI.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:4 (2007 & Supp. 2015).
31. See infra Part VI.B.
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1 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. This provision leaves the final
decision for well-location approval to the state while granting local
governments and their citizens a substantive voice in the state permitting
process to air their environmental and local health and safety concerns.32
Although that type of participation right does not necessarily mandate a
particular outcome, the state should be required to analyze and address
legitimate local concerns in its findings and conclusions before issuing
drilling permits. That participation right is not a panacea for all concerned
but somewhat mitigates the loss of autonomy that local governments feel
while balancing the need for statewide uniformity and control.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FRACKING DISPUTE IN ST. TAMMANY PARISH
A number of residents, along with the local government of St. Tammany
Parish, have a problem with oil and gas operations in their neighborhood.33
On March 31, 2014, Helis Oil & Gas (“Helis”) applied to the Louisiana
Office of Conservation (“LOC”), which is part of the Louisiana Department
of Natural Resources (“LDNR”), to create a single drilling and production
unit in the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale, Reservoir A, in the Lacombe Bayou
Field, in St. Tammany Parish.34 On the day before the hearing to consider
the unit application, St. Tammany Parish filed suit against the LOC for a
declaratory judgment to require the LOC to give primary consideration to
St. Tammany zoning ordinances in deciding whether to authorize formation
of the drilling and production unit.35 The St. Tammany ordinances, adopted
in 2006, zoned the relevant drilling area as residential, thus prohibiting
drilling at Helis’s proposed site.36 St. Tammany also prayed for an
injunction to prohibit the LOC’s forced pooling proceedings until the LOC
corrected enforcement and compliance deficiencies identified in an audit
report that the Louisiana Legislative Auditor’s Office prepared. Lastly, St.
Tammany Parish requested a declaration that St. Tammany had the option
to ban fracking.37

32. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
33. See Robert Rhoden, Proposed Oil and Gas Drilling Near Mandeville
Raises Concerns, NOLA.COM (Apr. 8, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.nola.com
/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/proposed_oil_and_gas_drilling.html [perma.cc/YY44UFJY].
34. Petition for Declaration and Injunctive Relief, St. Tammany Parish v.
Welsh, No. 631370 (La. Dist. Ct. June 16, 2014).
35. Id. ¶ 37.
36. Id. ¶ 24.
37. Id. ¶ 37.
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In response, the State argued that St. Tammany failed to state a cause of
action.38 According to the LOC, St. Tammany’s zoning ordinances were
preempted because the state comprehensively regulates every phase of the
oil and gas exploration and production process and because Louisiana
statutes expressly preempt a parish’s attempt to enforce its zoning
ordinances where oil and gas operations are concerned.39
Once Helis established the drilling unit, St. Tammany complained that
the LOC violated a mandatory statutory obligation to “consider”40 the
Parish’s zoning ordinances by approving the drilling unit in an area that the
Parish designated as not zoned for drilling.41 The LOC argued that an
obligation to consider a master plan did not require the state to deny the unit
application just because the Parish prohibited drilling at the site through its
zoning ordinances.42 Despite the ongoing lawsuit, the LOC issued Helis a
permit to drill a 13,000-foot vertical test well.43 On May 13, 2015, District
38. Technically, the LOC made a peremptory exception of no cause of action
to dismiss the lawsuit. Memorandum in Support of Conservation’s Exceptions to
the Plaintiff’s Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, St. Tammany
Parish v. Welsh, No. 631307 (La. Dist. Ct. July 11, 2014) [hereinafter LOC
Response Memorandum]; see also Montalvo v. Sondes, 637 So. 2d 127, 131 (La.
1994) (explaining peremptory exception of no cause of action).
39. LOC Response Memorandum, supra note 38, at 8–9.
40. Conservation’s Amended Exceptions to the Plaintiff’s First Supplemental
Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh,
No. 631307 (La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 1, 2014).
41. First Supplemental Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 4,
6, St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh, No. 631370 (La. Dist. Ct. Sept. 4, 2014). The
Parish relied on Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:109.1, which states:
“Whenever a parish or municipal planning commission has adopted a master plan,
state agencies and departments shall consider such adopted master plan before
undertaking any activity or action which would affect the adopted elements of the
master plan.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:109.1 (2013) (emphasis added).
42. Conservation’s Amended Exceptions to the Plaintiff’s First Supplemental
Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 40, at 8–9.
43. The approval was granted with an extensive list of conditions, including
restrictions on the water that may be used for fracking, disclosure of fracking
chemicals, groundwater monitoring, and the use of closed-loop systems, but most
of the conditions relating to fracking appear to be window dressing. The planned
well is a test well and commercial production from the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale
requires a horizontal interval. If the vertical well shows promise, then Helis must
apply for an additional permit to drill and complete the well as a horizontal well
before it hydraulically fractures the well. See Sara Pagones, State Approves
Controversial Drilling Permit in St. Tammany, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (Dec.
19, 2014, 4:53 PM), http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news/11137125171/state-approves-controversial-drilling-permit [perma.cc/Q9YH-8V5U].
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Judge William Morvant issued the court’s ruling and agreed with the LOC
that state law preempts the St. Tammany zoning ordinance, and in an issue
of first impression, that the obligation to “consider” a local zoning plan does
not require adherence by the state to restrictions in the local zoning plan.44
St. Tammany took a suspensive appeal to the Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal, allowing the Parish to enforce its zoning ordinance pending
appeal.45 As of November 5, 2015, the appellate court has not ruled on the
appeal, and St. Tammany has placed a “cease and desist” sign at the drilling
site.46
The Town of Abita Springs filed a related lawsuit on December 1, 2014
in the 22nd Judicial District in Covington, Louisiana.47 The court dismissed
that lawsuit on April 15, 2015, effectively holding that Abita Springs had no
right to enforce St. Tammany Parish’s zoning ordinances.48 Abita Springs,
however, filed a separate lawsuit in the 19th Judicial District, challenging
the process by which the LOC issued the drilling permit to Helis.49
For local residents, these challenges against fracking in St. Tammany
are as much about local autonomy as fear of environmental calamity.
Reduced to its legal essence, however, the St. Tammany suit simply is a
question of the scope and the breadth of the Louisiana oil and gas
preemption statute. The St. Tammany ordinance goes too far under state law
by prohibiting the drilling of a well in a particular location, but the Louisiana
Supreme Court has not resolved the extent to which local government in
Louisiana can regulate oil and gas operations. For example, it is not entirely
44. Judgment at 2, St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh, No. 631370 (La. Dist. Ct.
May 13, 2015). Specifically, the court held that the state complied with Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 33:109.1, which sets forth the obligation to “consider”
adopted master plans. See supra note 41.
45. Order, St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh, No. 631370 (La. Dist. Ct. June 15,
2015).
46. The First Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument on November 5,
2015. See Robert Rhoden, St. Tammany Fracking Fight Heard by Appeals Court in
Baton Rouge, NOLA.COM (Nov. 5, 2015, 3:26 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index
.ssf/2015/11/st_tammany_fracking_fight_hear.html [perma.cc/BUU4-D5NX]; see
also Robert Rhoden, Fracking Opponents Can’t Block St. Tammany Drilling
Operation, Judge Rules, NOLA.COM (Apr. 20, 2015, 11:41 AM), http://www.nola
.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/04/fracking_suit_hearing.html [perma.cc/4WMJ-J589].
47. See Robert Rhoden, Town of Abita Springs Files Its Own Lawsuit in Effort
to Block Proposed St. Tammany Fracking, NOLA.COM (Dec. 2, 2014, 3:27 PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/12/town_of_abita_springs_files_it.ht
ml [perma.cc/4F7E-X4SB].
48. Judgment at 1–2, Town of Abita Springs v. Welsh, No. 2014-15348 (La.
Dist. Ct. May 13, 2015).
49. See infra Part VI.B for a discussion of this separate lawsuit.
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clear whether reasonable surface restrictions on oil and gas wells, reasonable
setbacks from buildings and other structures, or even a complete ban on
fracking adopted by a local government might be valid. In part, this Article
addresses the extent of this local authority.
II. PREEMPTION STATUTES AND DECISIONS IN MOST STATES PRESERVE
AT LEAST SOME LAND USE AUTHORITY
In response to perceived risks of local intrusion on state interests in oil
and gas production, the conservative Texas and Oklahoma legislatures
recently enacted new preemption statutes. Although these statutes certainly
diminish local land use autonomy, they also continue to allow some local
authority over siting decisions. In several other producing states, local court
decisions have overturned local bans on drilling and fracking, while at the
same time recognizing that local governments still have an interest in local
land use.
A. The New Texas Preemption Statute
Local anxiety over oil and gas development is not limited to Louisiana.
Even the oil and gas friendly state of Texas has experienced local conflicts
recently, boiling over on November 4, 2014,50 when voters in the City of
Denton, Texas, approved the first local Texas ordinance that bans and
criminalizes hydraulic fracturing.51 One day later, two lawsuits were filed.
The first suit was filed by Jerry Patterson, Commissioner of the Texas
General Land Office, alleging that the ban may not be enforced against lands
and minerals that the State of Texas owns and that state law preempts the
ban.52 In the second suit, the Texas Oil and Gas Association alleged that
state law preempts the local ordinance, because state law both occupies the
entire field of oil and gas regulation and also conflicts with the exclusive

50. See Jim Malewitz, Dissecting Denton: How a Texas City Banned Fracking,
TEXAS TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2014), available at http://www.texastribune.org/2014/12/15
/dissecting-denton-how-texas-city-baned-fracking/ [perma.cc/UZJ2-336Q].
51. Denton, Tex., Ordinance Providing that Hydraulic Fracturing Operations
Are Prohibited in the City (Nov. 4, 2014) (amending DENTON, TEX., CODE OF
ORDINANCES ch. 16, art. VII (2014)). The ordinance is quite simple: “It shall be
unlawful for any person to engage in hydraulic fracturing within the corporate limits
of the City.” Id. Violation of the ordinance is punishable as a misdemeanor. Id.
52. Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Application for Permanent Injunction at 4–
5, Patterson v. City of Denton, No. D-1-GN-14-004628 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5,
2014).
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authority of the Texas Railroad Commission (“TRRC”)53 and the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) to regulate hydraulic
fracturing.54
Largely in response to the Denton fracking ban and the aspirations of
other local governments to adopt stricter rules,55 the Texas legislature passed
H.B. 40, which preempts local governments from regulating most aspects
of oil and gas operations.56 On May 19, 2015, Texas Governor Greg Abbott
signed H.B. 40 into law, effectively ending the Denton dispute.57
H.B. 40 is exceptionally broad, prohibiting local governments from
enacting or enforcing an ordinance or other measure that “bans, limits, or
otherwise regulates an oil and gas operation . . . .”58 The exception involves
an ordinance or measure that (1) regulates only surface activities, including
“reasonable setback requirements”; (2) “is commercially reasonable”; (3)
“does not effectively prohibit an oil and gas operation conducted by a
reasonably prudent operator”; and (4) “is not otherwise preempted by state
or federal law.”59
A condition in a local ordinance is “‘commercially reasonable’” if the
ordinance “would allow a reasonably prudent operator to fully, effectively,
and economically exploit, develop, produce, process, and transport oil and
gas, as determined based on the objective standard of a reasonably prudent
operator . . . .”60 An ordinance might allow drilling and still be invalid under
this commercially reasonable test if compliance costs make operations
uneconomical or restrictions impede the production of all recoverable
hydrocarbons.61 As such, the second requirement of commercial
53. The TRRC regulates oil and gas but no longer regulates railroads. Oil & Gas
Division, R.R. COMM’N TEX. (Jul. 20, 2015, 12:17 PM), http://www.rrc.state.tx.us
/about-us/organization-activities/divisions-of-the-rrc/oil-gas-division/ [perma.cc/D36
3-JTP7].
54. Original Petition at 8–10, Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Denton, No.
14-08933-431 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5, 2014).
55. See Mike Lee, After Denton Frack Ban, the Wrangling Over Drilling Rules
Goes On, ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/12
/08/stories/1060010064.
56. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West Supp. 2015); see also Marissa
Barnett, Abbott Signs Law to Restrict Local Fracking Regulations, DALL. MORNING
NEWS (May 18, 2015, 11:16 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/statepolitics/20150518-abbott-signs-law-to-restrict-local-fracking-regulations.ece
[perma.cc/55AY-P4RE].
57. Barnett, supra note 56.
58. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523(b).
59. Id. § 81.0523(b), (c).
60. Id. § 81.0523(a)(1).
61. See id. § 81.0523(a)(2).
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reasonableness appears to encompass the third requirement for a valid
ordinance—that the ordinance “does not effectively prohibit an oil and gas
operation.”
Both the second and third requirements employ the “reasonably prudent
operator” standard. Courts often apply this standard to determine whether
implied covenants imposed on the lessee under an oil and gas lease are
commercially reasonable and do not prohibit oil and gas operations.62 An oil
and gas lease is a relational contract, meaning a contract where the parties
have difficulty “reducing important terms of the arrangement to welldefined obligations.”63 In the typical oil and gas lease, the lessee has few, if
any, express contractual obligations other than to pay royalties on
production. Professors Goetz and Scott posit that parties to a relational
contract should define standards of performance in general terms.64 Based
on the proposals of prominent commentators, courts might have required
lessees to act with “best efforts” or as fiduciaries of their lessors.65 However,
courts have routinely rejected such a high standard.66 Courts instead
generally interpret the lessee’s obligations using a reasonably prudent
operator standard.67

62. Although these implied covenants expand and evolve over time, they
might be said to include requirements to drill an initial well, to reasonably develop
the lease after production, to protect against drainage, to produce and market
product, to operate with reasonable care, and to use modern methods of
production. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 567 n.1 (Tex.
1981) (citing R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.1 (1971)).
63. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principals of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981).
64. Id. at 1092.
65. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAW § 802.1 (2014) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MEYERS] (citing C.
Meyers & S. Crafton, The Covenant of Further Exploration – Thirty Years Later,
32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, 1-24 (1986)). An absolute duty to comply with
implied covenants may apply in limited circumstances, usually when the lessee
has caused the drainage of the property under lease. Alternatively, a few courts
have applied a weak good faith standard for implied covenants. The Williams and
Meyers treatise concludes that the prudent operator standard is the appropriate
standard for implied covenants among these various alternative performance
standards. Id. § 806.
66. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 855 F.2d 1141, 1145–46 (5th
Cir. 1988); Amoco Production Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d 1405, 1412 (10th Cir.
1990).
67. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, § 806 n.20 (listing cases); E.
KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 61.3 (1978).
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Substantively, the prudent operator standard might be compared to the
objective “reasonable man” standard under tort law. The Williams and
Meyers oil and gas treatise explains the standard:
Since the standard of conduct is objective, a defendant cannot
justify his act or omission on personal grounds or by reference to
his peculiar circumstances. It is no excuse that defendant . . . is short
of cash, over-committed on drilling programs, has no need for more
production, or prefers to spend his money on other things. In short,
the question is not what was meet and proper for this defendant to
do, given his peculiar circumstances, but what a hypothetical
operator acting reasonably would have done, given circumstances
generally obtained in the locality.68
Thus, the prudent operator standard is a single, objective standard that
takes into account external conditions but ignores unique internal facts
particular to the lessee.69 The authors of H.B. 40 apparently incorporated the
prudent operator standard to deter operators’ claims against local
governments that they could not comply with local regulations because of
their own atypical technical, financial, or other limitations.70 Thus, a local
ordinance is not preempted if the hypothetical reasonable operator can still
effectively and economically produce its oil and gas.
But no matter how commercially reasonable a restriction on fracking or
other underground operational activity might be, such restrictions are
preempted. The list of required elements of a valid ordinance contains the
conjunctive “and,” meaning that a valid local ordinance must be
commercially reasonable and must also regulate only surface activity. Thus,
the new Texas statute recognizes in absolute terms that the process of
drilling and completing a well is entirely within the jurisdiction of the state.
The statute does, however, allow for some local control, including the
location of wells.71 The statute recognizes that local regulations governing
“fire and emergency response, traffic, lights, or noise” are the types of
surface activities that local governments normally may regulate within the

68. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, § 806.
69. See David E. Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the
Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 10.04[3] (2002).
70. H.B. 40 also includes a potential savings clause for certain existing
ordinances: “An ordinance or other measure is considered prima facie to be
commercially reasonable if the ordinance or other measure has been in effect for
at least five years and has allowed the oil and gas operations at issue to continue
during that period.” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523(d) (West Supp. 2015).
71. Id. § 81.0523(c)(1).
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realm of local control.72 Furthermore, courts might permit regulations
governing location even in the context of drilling operations, including
setbacks and even traditional zoning ordinances that restrict particular uses to
certain zones, when the facts and circumstances allow a reasonably prudent
operator to access the formation through horizontal drilling and other
techniques and to conduct operations “fully, effectively, and economically.”73
Texas has completely preempted the “how” of underground drilling,
completion, and other operations, but it still allows Texas municipalities some
say over where wells can be drilled and the conduct of surface activities.
B. The New Oklahoma Preemption Statute
Just over a week after Governor Abbott signed the Texas preemption
bill, Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin signed a similar bill.74 The Oklahoma
bill, however, arguably is even more ambiguous than the Texas bill. Before
Governor Fallin signed the new bill into law, Oklahoma expressly allowed
“cities and towns governmental corporate powers to prevent oil or gas
drilling therein” and “to provide its own rules and regulations with reference
to well spacing units or drilling or production . . . .”75 The new statute allows
local governments to adopt reasonable ordinances concerning “road use,
traffic, noise and odors” and “reasonable setbacks and fencing requirements
for oil and gas well site locations as are reasonably necessary to protect the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. . . .”76 Such setbacks may not
72. Id.
73. Id. § 81.0523(a)(1). Future litigation will determine the objective
reasonableness of setbacks, zoning regulations, and other attempts to protect the
character of neighborhoods under specific ordinances. By incorporating an
objective standard, the statute avoids relitigating particular ordinances as applied to
different operators. The statute, however, only establishes objective reasonableness
or unreasonableness as of a particular point in time. Regulations that unreasonably
impede the operations of a reasonably prudent operator today using existing
technology and cost constraints might be reasonable in the future as technology
develops and the costs fall. In 2008, Maersk Oil Qatar completed a well with a
horizontal length of 35,770 feet (6.77 miles). Dennis Denney, Continuous
Improvement Led to the Longest Horizontal Well, J. PETROLEUM TECH., Nov.
2009, at 55. If wells with horizontal laterals of such length or longer become
commonplace, more onerous zoning and setback limitations might eventually be
acceptable.
74. 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 341 (codified at 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 137.1
(Supp. 2015)).
75. 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 137 (2011) (repealed by 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws
c. 341, § 2).
76. 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 137.1 (Supp. 2015).
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“effectively prohibit or ban any oil and gas operations,” including
fracking.77 The statute then goes on to state that “[a]ll other regulations of
oil and gas operations shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Corporation Commission.”78
The Oklahoma statute, which expressly allows “reasonable setbacks,”
does not expressly allow the zoning of oil and gas into industrial or other
districts. All local “regulations,” other than those expressly allowed by the
statute, are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, but the statute
does not define the words “regulation” or “operation.”79 Whether the
exclusive jurisdiction of the state is limited to technical operations involving
the drilling and completing of wells or whether the term “regulation” also
encompasses the location of wells through traditional zoning is yet to be
determined.80 Certainly, a municipality in Oklahoma could not prohibit
drilling because the legislature repealed the former statute that expressly
authorized drilling bans.81 Similar to the new Texas law, future litigation
will likely determine whether a municipality might also zone oil and gas into
reasonable industrial districts and what might constitute a reasonable
setback.82 In any event, the statute clearly leaves room for some local
authority as to the location of wells.
C. Court Decisions in Other States Recognize the Process/Land Use
Distinction
Recent court decisions in other states recognize the distinction between
the technical operational aspects of drilling and traditional land use.83 These
decisions usually conclude that absolute prohibitions on drilling and
production or completion technologies—including hydraulic fracturing—

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; Joe Wertz, City Officials
Reconsider Drilling Ordinances as Anti-Frack Ban Legislation Moves Forward, NPR
(Apr. 30, 2015, 12:48 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2015/04/30/cityofficials-reconsider-oil-and-gas-ordinances-as-anti-frack-ban-legislation-moves-for
ward/ [perma.cc/F47A-CJSJ] (question of what might be considered reasonable
drawing criticism).
83. For a more comprehensive discussion and analysis of the cases discussed
in this Part, see generally Alex Ritchie, Creatures of Circumstance: Conflicts
Over Local Government Regulation of Oil and Gas, 60 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
11-1, 11-6 (2015).
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frustrate state interests.84 The exception to this latter generalization is New
York, where the Court of Appeals held that the state legislature did not
intend for a statute that supersedes local government “regulation” of oil and
gas operations to preempt zoning and land use.85 The court explained that
zoning and land use are powers within the province of local governments
and that courts should protect these powers in deference to home rule
authority.86 To this court, a complete ban on oil and gas operations is simply
a zoning and land use decision that does not conflict with either the language
of the preemption statute or the policies of preventing waste and protecting
correlative rights in the state oil and gas statutes.87
In Pennsylvania, a plurality of four justices of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court completely invalidated two out of three express statutory
preemption provisions in the oil and gas conservation statute that the state
legislature had adopted.88 The plurality held that these preemption statutes
84. In addition to the cases discussed in this Part II.C, see Northeast Natural
Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376 (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (holding that the city lacks authority to enact a fracking
ban). For a discussion of this case, see Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Local Regulation
of Hydraulic Fracturing, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 593 (2014).
85. In In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014), the
New York Court of Appeals—New York’s highest court—consolidated the cases
of Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013), and Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 964
N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). The conclusion in In re Wallach was
preordained by the court’s decision in In re Frew Run Gravel Products, Inc. v.
Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987), where the court held that an
express preemption provision only applied to local laws that purported to regulate
the operational aspects of mining. Id. at 922. In In re Wallach, the court stated
that “this incidental control resulting from the municipality’s exercise of its right
to regulate land use through zoning is not the type of regulatory enactment relating
to the [oil, gas and solution mining industries] which the Legislature could have
envisioned as being within the prohibition of the statute.” 16 N.E.3d at 1197
(quoting Frew Run, 518 N.E. 2d at 920).
86. 16 N.E.3d at 1197.
87. Id. at 1199.
88. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 1000 (Pa. 2013). On
February 14, 2012, the Pennsylvania Legislature adopted “Act 13,” a
comprehensive statutory framework to regulate oil and gas operations. See 58 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301 to 3504 (West 2014). Act 13 contained three express
preemption provisions. The first, section 3302, supersedes local ordinances
“purporting to regulate oil and gas operations,” except those adopted pursuant to
the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code and the Flood Plain Management
Act. Id. § 3302. Section 3302 contains language almost identical to former section
601.602 of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, which Act 13 repealed, see 58 PA.
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violated a fairly unique state constitutional amendment that grants citizens
a right to clean air and water and imposes a public trust on the natural
resources of the state.89 According to the plurality, the offending preemption
provisions impeded the ability of local governments to protect their citizens
and the environment through the exercise of their land use authority.90
Pennsylvania, however, continues to recognize the distinction between
process and land use. One express preemption provision survived the
decision and continues to supersede the ability of Pennsylvania local
governments to regulate the technical operational aspects of drilling and
production in a manner that conflicts with state law.91
In Colorado and New Mexico, industry and state regulatory plaintiffs
challenging local bans have been successful in recent court actions.92 But

CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.602 (repealed 2012), and which previously was
interpreted as allowing local governments to zone oil and gas operations, but not
to regulate the operational aspects of drilling. See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v.
Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 865 (Pa. 2009). The second express
preemption provision, section 3303, expands on section 3302 by declaring that
state environmental acts “occupy the entire field of regulation” as it relates to the
environmental regulation of oil and gas. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303. The
third, section 3304, requires that oil and gas development be allowed as a
permitted use in any municipal zoning district, and that restrictions on oil and gas
development be no greater than those placed on other industrial uses. Id. §
3304(b)(3), (5). The plurality in Robinson Township struck down sections 3303
and 3304, but allowed section 3302 to stand. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1000.
89. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913; see also PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (“The
people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”).
90. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 978 (“Act 13 thus commands municipalities
to ignore their obligations under [the Environmental Rights Amendment] and
further directs municipalities to take affirmative actions to undo existing
protections of the environment in their localities.”). In contrast, the Louisiana
Constitution contains a mandate for the state to protect and conserve the “natural
resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic,
and esthetic quality of the environment.” LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Unlike the
language in the Pennsylvania Constitution, however, the language of this mandate
does not purport to create an individual constitutional right in the environment.
Id.; see also infra Part VI.B.
91. See supra note 88.
92. See Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment, Colo. Oil & Gas
Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63, 2014 WL 3690665 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
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these decisions do not upset the distinction between process and land use
and the ability of local governments to adopt reasonable zoning restrictions.
Neither the Colorado nor the New Mexico conservation statutes contain
express preemption provisions, but, in these recent Colorado and New
Mexico cases, the courts found preemption based on implied conflicts with
state law.
On July 24, 2014, the Boulder County District Court, on summary
judgment, struck down a local voter-initiated outright fracking ban that the
City of Longmont, Colorado, had adopted.93 The next month, the same court
struck down a broader ban on oil and gas extraction and storage that the City
of Lafayette, Colorado, had adopted.94 Also in August 2014, the Larimer
County District Court struck down a fracking ban—similar to the Longmont
ban—that the City of Fort Collins, Colorado, had adopted.95 Although these
courts held that the drilling and fracking bans went too far, none of these
cases question the decision in Board of County Commissioners, La Plata
County v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Inc.,96 where the Colorado Supreme
Court held that local governments have distinct interests in land use control
that differ from the state interest in regulating the technical operational
aspects of production.97
On January 19, 2015, the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico struck down a ban from Mora County that was similar to the
Lafayette, Colorado ordinance.98 In his decision, however, Judge James O.
Browning made clear that the New Mexico Oil and Gas Act does not address
issues with which local governments are traditionally concerned.99 That
holding leaves room for the concurrent jurisdiction of state and local
governments.

July 24, 2014); see also Memorandum Opinion and Order, SWEPI, LP v. Mora
Cnty., 81 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (D.N.M. 2015).
93. Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 92.
94. See Boulder District Judge Tosses Lafayette’s Fracking Ban, DENVER POST
BUS. (Aug. 27, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_26419597
/boulder-district-judge-tosses-lafayettes-fracking-ban [perma.cc/A836-FYE2].
95. Order Granting Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary Judgment on First Claim
for Relief and Denying Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Colo.
Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Fort Collins, No. 13CV31385 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 7,
2014).
96. 830 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
97. Id. at 1058.
98. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, SWEPI, LP v. Mora Cnty., supra
note 92.
99. 830 P.2d at 1195.
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Even in the rare case where a preemption provision purports to
expressly cover zoning and land use, courts may be reluctant to extend the
provision so far. In the recent case of State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy
Corp.,100 the Supreme Court of Ohio had the occasion to interpret Ohio
Revised Code section 1509.02, which grants the Ohio Department of Natural
Resources the “sole and exclusive authority to regulate the permitting,
location, and spacing of oil and gas wells and production operations” within
Ohio.101 The statute only preserves to municipalities special powers relating
to certain public infrastructure and heavy vehicles operating on their
highways.102 The City of Munroe Falls sought an injunction to require Beck
Energy to comply with its ordinances before Beck began drilling
operations.103 The ordinances imposed the City’s own permitting system
replete with conditions, including the requirement for a conditional zoning
certificate that could contain whatever conditions the City might choose to
impose.104 To the 4-3 majority, these conditions impermissibly violated
Ohio’s express preemption provision.105
Despite the word “location” in the statute, some members of the court
sought to restrict the reach of the holding. Concurring in the judgment only,
Justice O’Donnell wrote separately to emphasize that the court’s holding
was limited to the Munroe Falls ordinances at issue.106 For Justice
O’Donnell, the case did not present the question of whether the express
preemption provision conflicts with traditional land use ordinances that do
not impose a separate permitting regime.107 He argued the word “location”
has a meaning in oil and gas law that relates only to the efficient production
of oil and gas, a meaning that does not implicate zoning.108
In dissent, Justice Lazinger, joined by Justices Pfeifer and O’Neill, did
not dispute the breadth of the preemption provision but instead relied on the
Ohio presumption in favor of home rule.109 Justice Lazinger argued that
more than a preemption statement is necessary to preempt in Ohio. Rather,
the general law must actually regulate in the same area as the local law,110
100. 37 N.E.3d 128 (Ohio 2015).
101. 15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013-0465, 2015 WL
687475, at *5 (Ohio Feb. 17, 2015).
104. Id.
105. Id. at *8.
106. Id. at *38.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *43–44.
109. Id. at *53–56.
110. Id. at *56.
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which presumably means in this case that the state must mandate and specify
local zoning regulations for oil and gas.
The legislature or the courts in each of the states discussed in this Part,
including those states that deem outright bans a violation of important state
interests, in varying degrees recognize a role for local governments to
exercise authority over the siting of wells under their land use powers. As
discussed in Part III, Louisiana is different, vesting the state with virtually
complete authority to determine where wells may be sited.
III. LOUISIANA AT THE EXTREME OF STATE CONTROL
Securing the character of neighborhoods under the zoning power has
long been recognized as an essential power of local governments, but under
Louisiana law, that power is not unlimited. In the oil and gas context, the
zoning power is constrained by an express preemption statute, Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:28(F).111 This Part analyzes the statute in light
of existing precedent and in the context of the zoning power, concluding
that—despite arguments to the contrary—the language of the statute leaves
little room for local authority over either the location of wells or the process
of drilling or completing (including fracking) a well. The extent of this
balance in favor of the state may appear extreme,112 particularly in light of
other states’ laws that allow some degree of local autonomy, but to change
this balance in deference to the policy underlying zoning would require
legislative action.
A. Reserving Land as Justification for Local Control
All of these state–local conflicts with oil and gas production center on
the ability of local governments to protect and provide for the welfare of
their citizens. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “reserving
land for single-family residences preserves the character of neighborhoods,
securing ‘zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.’”113 The
111. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(F) (Supp. 2015).
112. In oral argument on appeal of the St. Tammany case, Judge Guidry
apparently asked whether, despite zoning, a well could be drilled on the 50-yard
line inside Louisiana State University’s Tiger Stadium, and apparently counsel
for the state answered that it could. Robert Rhoden, St. Tammany Fracking Fight
Heard by Appeals Court in Baton Rouge, NOLA.COM (Nov. 5, 2015, 3:26 PM),
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/11/st_tammany_fracking_fight_hear.
html [perma.cc/B4CF-SUEP].
113. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1995)
(quoting Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)).

830

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

need for local governments to provide these zoning sanctuaries has justified
judicial deference to local government zoning since the 1926 decision in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,114 where the Court referred to
undesirable uses as “merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard.”115
Parishes and municipalities in Louisiana, as in other states, regulate land
use under its police power.116 Zoning is related to the police power, in that
the right to prescribe and proscribe land uses under the zoning power derives
from the police power.117 One treatise has described the police power as “the
exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety,
health, morals and the general welfare of society within constitutional
limits.”118
Before the adoption of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, local zoning
ordinances were authorized under the 1921 Louisiana Constitution. This
prior version of the state constitution provided general authority to
municipalities to “zone their territory; to create residential, commercial and
industrial districts, and to prohibit the establishment of places of business in
residential districts.”119 This provision did not restrict legislative power to
delegate zoning authority to other political subdivisions, such as parishes,120
nor the parish and municipal power to create types of districts, other than
the enumerated residential, commercial, and industrial districts.121
The 1974 Louisiana Constitution explicitly extends an independent
grant of authority to all local government subdivisions to adopt zoning and
land use regulations, subject only to “uniform procedures established by
law.”122 Although this authority derives directly from the 1974 Constitution,
114. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
115. Id. at 388.
116. Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So.
2d 482, 488 (La. 1990).
117. Four States Realty Co., Inc. v. Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 659, 672 (La.
1975); see also Coffee City v. Thompson, 535 S.W.2d 758, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976); Forks Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. George Calantoni & Sons, Inc., 297 A.2d
164, 166 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972); Maldini v. Ambro, 330 N.E.2d 403, 405 (N.Y.
1975); Hausmann & Johnson, Inc. v. Berea Bd. of Bldg. Code Appeals, 320
N.E.2d 685, 688 (Ohio 1974).
118. 6 PATRICK J. ROHAN & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS § 35.05 (LexisNexis Mathew Bender 2015).
119. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 29 (1921).
120. Plebst v. Barnwell Drilling Co., 148 So. 2d 584, 591 (La. 1963).
121. Folsom Rd. Civic Ass’n v. St. Tammany Parish, 407 So. 2d 1219, 1223
(La. 1981).
122. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 17 (1974). Zoning ordinances and other laws
adopted before 1974 must be constitutional under the 1974 Constitution and must
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the Louisiana Supreme Court has not determined whether the state can deny
the zoning power to local governments except when necessary to protect a
vital state interest. In fact, the court expressly declined to answer the
question in St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. Riverboat Gaming
Commission,123 instead concluding that the state had not denied the zoning
power.124
Although broad, this express constitutional grant of zoning power is
clearly not unlimited. First, the constitution makes clear that local zoning
power may not abridge the police power of the state,125 meaning that the
zoning power may not impinge a state power that is necessary to protect a
vital interest of the state as a whole.126 The courts, however, have not
answered whether the state’s interest in oil and gas production is a vital
interest or whether the state’s preemption of that interest is necessary.
Second, local zoning authority is subject to state-mandated procedures.127
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the “subject to” language
requires the state to issue procedures for parish zoning before a parish may
zone,128 meaning that state-issued procedures are essential. The fact that the
court requires the state to authorize zoning implies that the state could deny
zoning power by an express general law preemption provision, even to
protect an interest that is not necessarily vital. Third, despite the
constitutional grant of zoning authority, the state must not exercise that
authority in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious manner.129
To fulfill the constitutional promise of zoning, the state legislature has
enacted zoning enabling acts. For the purposes of “promoting the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of the community,” municipalities and
most parishes may regulate and restrict the location and use of buildings,
also have been constitutional when enacted under the 1921 Constitution. See LA.
CONST. art. XIV, § 18(A); Azalea Lakes P’ship v. Parish of St. Tammany, 859
So. 2d 57, 60 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
123. 648 So. 2d 1310, 1318 (La. 1995).
124. Id. at 1318, n.7 (“Because we decide here that [the state law] does not deny
zoning and land use powers to local governments, we do not need to reach the issue
urged by amicus curiae of whether the state legislature is empowered to limit or
deny the express constitutional grant of this authority to all local governments by
any act less imperative than an exercise of the state’s police power necessary to
protect the vital interest of the state as a whole.”).
125. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
126. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
127. See Am. Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury,
609 So. 2d 201, 204–05 (La. 1992).
128. See id.
129. See City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dirs. of La. State Museum, 739 So. 2d
748, 759 (La. 1999).
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structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.130 This
regulatory authority is checked by the judicial review of zoning ordinances
and decisions made under those ordinances for abuse of discretion,
unreasonable exercise of the police powers, excessive use of the zoning
power, or the denial of the right of due process.131
For zoning purposes, the municipality or parish may divide itself into
districts, provided that the regulations of permitted actions are uniform
throughout each particular district.132 Zoning regulations must be made in
accordance with a comprehensive plan and must reasonably consider the
character of each district and the suitability for particular uses, encouraging
the appropriate use of land throughout the municipality.133 The plan
requirement is essential because a single prohibitive industry regulation
without a comprehensive plan is invalid.134 The plan does not need to be
terribly comprehensive in practice, however. The creation of a single district
apparently qualifies as a comprehensive plan.135
Courts presume all zoning ordinances are valid, and whoever attacks the
validity of an ordinance bears the burden of proof.136 Further, since the 1923
case of State ex rel Civello v. City of New Orleans,137 Louisiana courts have
not questioned the motivations of the governmental unit in promoting
health, safety, and welfare, where concern for the public could have been
the motivating factor, regardless of whether the concern actually was.138
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4721 (2009) (municipalities); Id. § 33:4780.40
(parishes).
131. Id. § 33:4721 (municipalities); Id. § 33:4780.40 (parishes); see also
Guenther v. Zoning Appeals Bd., 542 So. 2d 612, 614 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4722 (2009) (municipalities); Id. § 33:4780.41
(parishes).
133. Id. § 33:4723 (municipalities); Id. § 33:4780.42 (parishes).
134. See Trail Mining, Inc. v. Vill. of Sun, 619 So. 2d 118, 119 (La. Ct. App.
1993) (ordinance that required 1200 foot setbacks between a gravel pit and a
residence held invalid without comprehensive plan). The Village argued that the
ordinance was not a zoning ordinance, but a health and safety ordinance. Id.
Although the Village abandoned this argument, the court nevertheless “confirms”
that the ordinance is a zoning ordinance. Id.
135. See Jameson v. St. Tammany Parish Police Jury, 225 So. 2d 720, 723–24
(La. Ct. App. 1969); LaRussa Enters., Inc. v. Gordon, No. 2012-0896 (La. Ct.
App. 2013) (unpublished opinion).
136. Four States Realty Co., Inc. v. Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 659, 672 (La. 1975).
137. 97 So. 440 (La. 1923).
138. See id. at 443–44 (“It is not necessary, for the validity of the ordinances
in question, that we should deem the ordinances justified by considerations of
public health, safety, comfort, or the general welfare. It is sufficient that the
municipal council could reasonably have had such considerations in mind. If such
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This standard is roughly equivalent to the “fairly debatable” standard that
the United States Supreme Court has employed since Euclid to judge the
validity of local ordinances on due process grounds.139
In addition to this deferential standard, under express language in the
Louisiana statutes, when zoning regulations impose a “higher” standard than
“any other statute or local ordinance or regulation,” the higher standard
controls.140 In the context of the statute, the higher standard appears to
connote the more restrictive standard, meaning that in the case of a conflict
between state law and local law, the more restrictive standard should
normally control.141 Accordingly, unless their power is preempted,
municipalities have the ability to supplement state regulation with more
restrictive standards in their jurisdictions. Although this rule for
municipalities in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:4729 is unqualified,
the corresponding rule for parishes in Louisiana Revised Statutes section
33:4780.49 diverges. The penultimate sentence of Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 33:4780.49 states:
However, no local governing authority shall restrict, conflict with,
interfere with, or supersede the powers of the state through its
agencies to regulate, permit, or enforce environmental laws and
regulations nor shall they restrict, conflict with, interfere with, or
supersede activities operating in accordance with authorized state
or federal permits, laws, or regulations.142

considerations could have justified the ordinances, we must assume that they did
justify them.”); see also Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu
Parish, 561 So. 2d 482, 491–92 (La. 1990); Palermo, 561 So. 2d at 491–92
(quoting State ex rel. Civello with approval).
139. See Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
Professor Bruce Kramer coined the name of the “fairly debatable” test because
“the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes” need only be
“fairly debatable” to survive judicial scrutiny. See Bruce M. Kramer, Local Land
Use Regulation of Extractive Industries: Evolving Judicial and Regulatory
Approaches, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 41, 44, 63 (1996).
140. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4729 (2009) (municipalities); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33:4780.49 (parishes).
141. The Louisiana statute relating to building codes that political subdivisions
adopt is more clear. That statute provides that “[i]f the provisions of a building
code adopted by a political subdivision are more stringent than [] state laws . . .
the more restrictive standards shall govern within the area under the jurisdiction
of the political subdivision.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4773.
142. Id. § 33:4780.49.
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This “however” language plainly subordinates more restrictive local
regulations to activities authorized under state-issued permits, including oil
and gas drilling permits and forced pooling orders. As such, municipalities
seemingly have greater authority to adopt more restrictive zoning regulations
than do parishes.
B. Louisiana Statutes Preempt Land Use Authority
Despite the constitutional and statutory protections afforded to zoning,
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F) strips municipalities of the
power to secure zones and protect the character of neighborhoods in the oil
and gas context. That statute provides:
The issuance of the [drilling] permit by the commissioner of
conservation shall be sufficient authorization to the holder of the
permit to enter upon the property covered by the permit and to
drill in search of minerals thereon. No other agency or political
subdivision of the state shall have the authority, and they are
hereby expressly forbidden, to prohibit or in any way interfere
with the drilling of a well or test well in search of minerals by the
holder of such a permit.143
In 2005, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion
to interpret this broad grant of power to the state in Energy Management
Corp. v. City of Shreveport (“EMC 1”),144 a case that the LOC extensively
relied upon in its briefs in the St. Tammany case.145 In EMC 1, the City of
Shreveport passed a zoning ordinance that prohibited drilling within 1,000
feet of a lake.146 The plaintiff, Energy Management Corp., acquired leases
to drill in and around the lake and sued the City after the City made clear
that it would not issue a variance.147
For some inexplicable reason, the EMC 1 court stated that no express
statutory provision mandated preemption,148 even though municipalities and
parishes are “expressly forbidden” under Louisiana Revised Statutes section
30:28(F) from prohibiting or interfering with the drilling of an oil and gas

143. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(F) (Supp. 2015).
144. 397 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2005).
145. LOC Response Memorandum, supra note 38, at 8–9.
146. 397 F.3d at 299.
147. Id. at 300.
148. Id. at 303 (“In this case there is no express provision mandating preemption.”).
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well. In apparent reliance on a field preemption analysis,149 however, the
court remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment that the local
ordinance “is preempted by state law and is invalid to the extent that it
purports to prohibit the drilling of oil and gas wells in an area within the
state of Louisiana . . . .”150
On remand, the district court entered the judgment exactly as written by
the Fifth Circuit EMC 1 court,151 but the plaintiff noted a significant problem
with the court’s language.152 Although the EMC 1 court struck down
municipal restrictions regarding where Energy Management Corp. could
drill wells, the court failed to address other costly technical or operational
conditions or regulations that local governments might impose that
“interfere” with the drilling of a well. On appeal in Energy Management
Corp. v. City of Shreveport (“EMC 2”),153 the Fifth Circuit broadened its
holding to preempt the local law in its entirety, both as to the location of
wells and as to other “‘activities,’” including “‘every phase’” of
operations.154
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, has never addressed Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:28(F) in the context of a fracking ban or a
reasonable traditional zoning ordinance that divides land uses into districts.
The EMC 1 court quotes the Louisiana Supreme Court that “‘the authority
and responsibility for conserving Louisiana’s oil and gas resources are
virtually entirely vested in the [LOC].’”155 This statement in isolation,
however, by no means vests authority in the LOC to control reasonable local
land use decisions.
149. Field preemption occurs when state law occupies the entire field of
regulation, such that there is no room for local regulation. Once a court finds field
preemption, the key question becomes how broadly or narrowly the legislature
intended to define the “field,” a question left for the judiciary. See Ritchie, supra
note 83, at 11-70.
150. EMC 1, 397 F.3d at 306 (emphasis added).
151. See Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, CIV. A. 97-2408, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43715 (W.D. La. May 5, 2005), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
remanded by Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471 (5th Cir.
2006).
152. See 467 F.3d at 475–76.
153. 467 F.3d 471.
154. Id. at 478 (citing 397 F.3d at 303).
155. EMC 1, 397 F.3d at 303 (quoting Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor, 644 So. 2d
191, 196–97 (La. 1994)). The authority to conserve oil and gas does not
necessarily extend to land use. See supra Part II.C. Batchelor actually involved a
question of the correlative rights of under-produced owners in a gas balancing
situation, which clearly is within the statutory authority of the LOC. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 31:9 to :11 (2000).
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Citing a number of cases, the EMC 1 court also states that “[i]n every
case which has been brought to our attention involving a challenge to the
authority of the LOC, its far-reaching authority has been upheld.”156 The
court, however, fails to mention City of Baton Rouge v. Hebert,157 where the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal determined that adding storage
tanks to a drill site impermissibly extended to a non-conforming use under
a local zoning ordinance.158 With little analysis, the Hebert court
acknowledged that “aspects” of petroleum production were preempted, but
the court did “not believe the state’s preemption in this field extends to
abridging a municipality’s control over land use within its corporate
boundary . . . .”159 This situation is just the type of distinction between
process and land use that Professor Kenneth Murchison described as the
appropriate dividing line for state and local regulation.160
Further, the cases that the EMC 1 court cited are relevant, but they are
at least somewhat distinguishable. In one cited case, Rollins Environmental
Services of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury,161 the police jury
of Iberville Parish amended its local ordinance to prohibit the injection and
storage of hazardous waste.162 This practice prevented the plaintiff from
operating its industrial residue disposal well that the LOC had already
permitted. The court reviewed not only state law but also federal laws such
as the Clean Water Act163 and the Recourse Conservation and Recovery
Act.164 The court held that, when considered together, federal and state laws
preempted the entire field of hazardous waste regulation.165
In Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Commission of Calcasieu Parish,166
however, the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished Rollins.167 The court
explained that Rollins concerned hazardous wastes and Palermo concerned
non-hazardous wastes.168 The Palermo court further explained that even
with respect to hazardous wastes, the legislature had amended the statute to
156. EMC 1, 397 F.3d at 303.
157. 378 So. 2d 144 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
158. Id. at 146.
159. Id.
160. See infra note 249 and accompanying text. Admittedly, however, Hebert
did not involve the drilling of a well.
161. 371 So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979).
162. Id. at 1129.
163. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
165. Rollins, 371 So. 2d at 1134.
166. 561 So. 2d 482 (La. 1990).
167. Id. at 497 n.15.
168. Id.
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allow the regulation by both parishes and municipalities of “the initial siting
of facilities pursuant to general land use planning, zoning, or solid waste
disposal ordinances.”169 Accordingly, Palermo at least raises the question as
to whether the Louisiana Supreme Court’s preemption stance in Rollins has
softened.
Despite these subtle arguments, Louisiana Revised Statutes section
30:28(F) is nonetheless clear and extends broad power to the state
government. As the language provides, a local government may not prohibit
or interfere with the drilling of a well that the LOC has authorized.170 When
the LOC issues a drilling permit, it authorizes drilling at a particular
location. A local government that prohibits drilling in that location, whether
through reasonable or unreasonable regulation, violates the express statutory
mandate in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F). Thus, the
preemption statute prohibits not only zoning oil and gas into districts, as St.
Tammany attempted to do, but it also prohibits local governments from
imposing setbacks. Given the breadth of the express preemption language,
the result in EMC 1 comports with the statutory language.171
In contrast, the EMC 2 holding—that every phase of oil and gas
operations is preempted—does not entirely accord with the preemption
language. Consider a fracking ban, which certainly interferes with the
process of extracting minerals, particularly from shale. An argument can be
made that a fracking ban does not interfere with the drilling of a well if
fracking is viewed as a separate well stimulation process. Such an argument,
however, would likely fail in a Louisiana court.172 If the Louisiana
Legislature saw fit to preempt the regulation of the location of wells,
certainly the courts would preserve traditional state authority over the
process by which wells are drilled and completed as they have in other
states, including those without an express preemption statute.173
IV. LOUISIANA’S HOME RULE AUTHORITY FAILS TO SUPPORT LOCAL
REGULATION OF THE LOCATION OF WELLS
Home rule traditions and the attendant philosophy of local autonomy
provide a policy basis for a local voice in decisions regarding oil and gas
169. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1236(31)(a)) (internal quotations
omitted).
170. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(F) (2007).
171. The EMC 1 court concluded that “the process of regulating when and
where an oil and gas well may be drilled within the state is entirely vested in the
LOC.” EMC 1, 397 F.3d 297, 304 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
172. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
173. See supra Part II.C.
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operations. In the New York case Matter of Wallach, home rule and the
importance of land use powers served as the foundational justification for
the court’s distinction between process and land use, which led to a
determination that preemption of “regulation” did not preempt zoning out
oil and gas operations.174 Similarly, based on the opinion of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in City of New Orleans v. Board of Commissioners of the
Orleans Levee District,175 pre-1974 home rule entities could argue that their
home rule powers included the right to regulate oil and gas operations
through their zoning and land use powers free of the preemption statute—
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F). The Louisiana Supreme Court,
however, has retreated over time from its decision in City of New Orleans.176
In light of judicial decisions since City of New Orleans, the express
prohibitions in Louisiana’s preemption statute would likely defeat any home
rule entities’ legal claim of right to regulate the location of wells in
Louisiana.
A. The Road to Home Rule in Louisiana
Before Louisiana adopted a new constitution in 1974, Louisiana courts
routinely held that “[p]arishes and municipal corporations of [the] state are
vested with no powers, and possess no authority, except such as are
conferred upon, or delegated to, them by the Constitution and statutes.”177
Political subdivisions were mere “creatures of the state, established by the
legislature for the purpose of administering local affairs of government.”178
The lack of significant local authority was partly a product of the 1921
Constitution and partly the result of court marginalization of any authority
that the Louisiana Legislature granted. The 1921 Constitution was a heavily
detailed document that read more like a set of statutes.179 Due to its
excessive detail, that constitution required frequent amendments to adapt to
changing times, changing circumstances, and political whims. After being

174. See In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1194–95 (N.Y.
2014).
175. 640 So. 2d 237, 251 (La. 1994).
176. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dirs. of La. State Museum, 739
So. 2d 748 (La. 1999).
177. State v. Jordan, 20 So. 2d 543, 545 (La. 1944).
178. Pyle v. City of Shreveport, 40 So. 2d 235, 238 (1949) (quoting Edwards
v. Town of Ponchatoula, 34 So. 2d 394, 397 (La. 1948)).
179. See LA. CONST. (1921).
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amended 536 times, virtually no one but a few scholars felt the 1921
Constitution was understandable.180
The original 1921 Constitution contained no home rule provisions, but
home rule amendments were added for the cities of Shreveport and New
Orleans in 1948 and 1950, respectively, and for the parishes of East Baton
Rouge and Jefferson in 1946 and 1956, respectively.181 Two general home
rule provisions were added in 1960 and 1968.182 Despite these home rule
amendments, “in operation they did not result in an escape from Dillon’s
Rule and local officials continued to trek to the state capital in pursuit of
specific statutory authorizations.”183
In response to Dillon’s Rule, home rule was developed. Under its
original form, referred to as imperio or traditional home rule,184 home rule
local governments were granted the authority to govern their local affairs,
but they had no authority in state-wide matters.185 The judiciary continued
to define the state–local dichotomy in a case-by-case ad hoc manner.186
Out of concern for judicial decisions that routinely marginalized local
governance, the American Municipal Association introduced a new form of
home rule—legislative home rule—in the 1950s, which the National
Municipal League revised in 1968.187 Under this form of home rule, the local
government may exercise the entire police power of the state without

180. Mark T. Carleton, Elitism Sustained: The Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
54 TUL. L. REV. 560, 563 (1980).
181. Richard Engstrom & Robert K. Whelan, Louisiana, in HOME RULE IN
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 173, 174 (Dale Krane et al. eds. 2000)
[hereinafter, HOME RULE HANDBOOK].
182. Id.
183. Richard L. Engstrom & Patrick F. O’Connor, State Centralization Versus
Home Rule: A Note on Ambition Theory’s Powers Proposition, 30 W. POL. Q.
288, 290 (1977). Dillon’s Rule is a descriptive legal principle that limits the power
of local government to those powers that are expressly granted, necessarily or
fairly implied or incident to the power expressly granted, or essential to the
indispensable purposes of the local government. JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (1872).
184. See St. Louis v. West Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893)
(describing imperio home rule in St. Louis under a charter appointing its powers
as an “imperium in imperio,” or a state within a state).
185. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a).
186. See Kenneth Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since
the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1975).
187. See NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 16 (6th ed.
1968).
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concern about the state–local dichotomy, but the legislature may deny the
local government most substantive powers via statute.188
Led by political conservatives that favored less centralized government
and by those with more locally directed political commitments,189 the
delegates of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution sought to strengthen home rule
in Louisiana to “end a period of de facto state legislative supremacy over
local government.”190 The new 1974 Constitution created two separate
classes of legislative home rule local governments. A local government that
had already adopted a home rule charter when the new constitution became
effective retained its already-possessed powers to the extent that the powers
were consistent with the new constitution. If permitted by its charter, this
local government would also possess the powers of other local
governments.191
Local governments that adopted a home rule charter after the ratification
of the 1974 Constitution were allowed to include in their charter any powers
“necessary, requisite, or proper for the management of [their] affairs, not
denied by general law or inconsistent with this constitution.”192 Most home
rule local governments in Louisiana, including St. Tammany Parish,193
188. See Vanlandingham, supra note 186, at 3.
189. See Engstrom & O’Connor, supra note 183, at 293–94.
190. HOME RULE HANDBOOK, supra note 181, at 173.
191. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
192. Id. § 5. Non-home rule local governments may exercise the same general
powers as post-1974 home rule local governments not denied by general laws or
inconsistent with the Constitution, except that a majority of the voting electorate
must approve general powers because they have not already incorporated in the
home rule charter. See id. § 7. As described in R. Gordon Kean, Jr., Local
Government and Home Rule, 21 LOY. L. REV. 63 (1975), the four categories of
local governments under the scheme of Article VI, are: (1) non-home rule local
governments operating under state charters, existing general law, or the Lawrason
Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 33:321 to :481; (2) non-home rule local
governments exercising home rule powers by a vote of electors; (3) local
governments that adopt a new home rule charter after the 1974 Constitution; and
(4) home rule governments that continue to exist under charters adopted before
the 1974 Constitution. Id. at 67–68. The Lawrason Act provides that a mayorboard of alderman governs all municipalities, other than those that a special
legislative charter or a home rule charter governs. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:321
(2013).
193. St. Tammany voters approved the parish’s first charter in 1979, but that
charter was repealed in 1983, reverting the parish to a regular police jury system.
BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, THE ST. TAMMANY PARISH HOME RULE
CHARTER: AN ASSESSMENT 4 (May 2002). A new charter was adopted in 1998.
Id. at 5.
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adopted their home rule charter after 1974, and thus fall under the National
Municipal League legislative home rule model.
B. Judicial Invigoration of Louisiana Home Rule
In what many commentators considered a landmark decision, Justice
James L. Dennis, writing for the City of New Orleans majority, found the
distinction between pre-1974 and post-1974 home rule governments
significant.194 According to Justice Dennis, not only were pre-1974 home
rule governments not limited by the requirement that ordinances be
“necessary, requisite or proper for the management of [their] affairs” in
contrast to post-1974 home rule government,195 but they also were not
necessarily restrained by inconsistent state “general laws.”196 To the extent
earlier cases found differently, Justice Dennis considered those findings
nonessential to their holdings and mere dicta.197
The rights and powers of these pre-1974 home rule local governments
are vast—but not absolute—under article VI, section 9(b) of the 1974
Constitution. That provision provides that “[n]otwithstanding any provision
of this Article, the police power of the state shall never be abridged.”198
194. 640 So. 2d 237, 243–44 (La. 1994).
195. Id. at 244 (internal quotations omitted).
196. Id. at 247. A state law is a general law, and not a local or special law, if
its operation extends to the whole state. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So.
2d 1, 17 (La. 2001). In contrast, a local law is a law that operates only in a
particular area or locality without the possibility of extending to other localities
or areas, and a special law is a law that “operates upon and affects only a fraction
of the persons or a portion of the property encompassed by a classification,
granting privileges to some while denying them to others.” Id. at 18.
197. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 257. In so holding, the court
essentially overrules one of its earlier decisions. Id. at 247 (“We reject the notion
suggested by the lead opinion in City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318,
1320–21 (La. 1983), that Article VI, § 4 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution adopts
by implied reference a 1921 constitutional provision that requires the [local
government’s] exercise of its home rule power to yield to any inconsistent general
state law.”). The court characterizes City of New Orleans as “simply wrong and
has been subject to cogent judicial and scholarly criticism.” 640 So. 2d at 255.
198. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(B). The principle that the police power of the state
shall not be abridged does not need to be stated in the constitution. “[T]he ‘police
power’ is the legislative authority enjoyed by the states, i.e. not constitutionally
delegated to the federal government or constitutionally appropriated by the federal
Congress, as the residuary sovereigns in our federal system.” City of Baton Rouge
v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311, 1319 n.10 (La. 1995) (emphasis in original). “This
corresponds to the ‘general principle of judicial interpretation that, unlike the
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Although Justice Dennis viewed this language as ambiguous, he concluded
that courts must construe the broad home rule powers granted to pre-1974
home rule local governments in harmony with state laws,199 which is a
difficult task when otherwise valid local ordinances conflict directly with
state law.
Pre-1974 home rule local governments have a power of immunity “to
act without fear of the supervisory authority of the state government.”200 For
these home rule entities, the court must first determine whether the local law
at issue conflicts with state law. If the local law conflicts, the state law will
preempt the local law only if the state law is necessary to protect a vital
interest of the state as a whole.201 For a state statute to be necessary, the
proponent must show that the protection of the vital state interest “cannot be
achieved through alternate means significantly less detrimental to home rule
powers and rights.”202
One might argue that, despite the admonition of Justice Dennis, a pre1974 home rule government still has no power to regulate oil and gas
operations because it had no such powers when the 1974 Constitution was
adopted. Section 4 of the 1974 Constitution states that “each local
governmental subdivision which has adopted such a home rule charter or
plan of government shall retain the powers . . . in effect when this
constitution is adopted.”203 The 1974 Constitution post-dated the current
version of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F), which was adopted
in 1959, by 15 years.204 As discussed above, the Fifth Circuit held that
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:28(F) repudiates local authority to
regulate both where oil and gas wells may be located and how they might
be drilled.205 Accordingly, pre-1974 home rule governments lacked the
power to regulate oil and gas drilling when the 1974 Constitution was
adopted, a deprivation that continued unaffected.
City of New Orleans, however, counsels to the contrary. According to
Justice Dennis, the test is not whether a pre-1974 local home rule
government had the power to regulate when the 1974 Constitution was
federal constitution, a state’s constitution’s provisions are not grants of power but
instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people of a state
exercised through its legislature.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Directors of La. Recovery
Dist. v. Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384, 387 (La 1988)).
199. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 252.
200. Id. at 242.
201. Id. at 252.
202. Id.
203. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (emphasis added).
204. See Act. No. 66, § 1, 1959 La. Acts 204.
205. See supra Part III.B.
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adopted, because “the drafters and ratifiers intended to emancipate and
continue in effect the preexisting home rule charters free of the conditions
and restraints that had been placed upon them by the 1921 Constitution.”206
According to Justice Dennis, only the terms of the 1974 Constitution limit
the powers of preexisting home rule governments set forth in their charters,
including any amendments to those charters adopted in accordance with
those charters.207 After City of New Orleans, the 1974 Constitution allows
such local governments to regulate in areas of state-wide concern so long as
conflicting state laws are not “necessary” to protect the “vital” interests of
the state as a whole.208
Under these principles, courts, rather than the legislature, must
determine when a state interest is relatively vital or relatively nonessential
along a spectrum, giving liberal deference to pre-1974 home rule power. In
the case of City of New Orleans itself, Justice Dennis concluded that the
state’s interest in allowing the Orleans Levy District to construct, maintain,
and operate a marina on state land at South Shore Harbor was not sufficient
to prevent the City from enforcing violations of its zoning ordinances and
the Levy District’s building codes.209 Based solely on City of New Orleans,
a pre-1974 home rule local government might credibly argue that it has the
power to regulate the location of wells despite the express preemption
provision.
C. Judicial Re-marginalization of Louisiana Home Rule
Despite Justice Dennis’s persuasive rhetoric, home rule was not freed
from the shackles of Dillon’s Rule as some predicted.210 Later precedent
interpreting City of New Orleans often reverts to a standard more tolerant of
conflicting state legislation, finding preemption based on state interests that

206. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 245.
207. Id. at 245–46.
208. The 1974 Louisiana Constitution contains other exceptions that prohibit
localities from providing for the punishment of a felony, enacting ordinances
governing private relationships, reducing the compensation of an elected official,
and establishing or affecting courts. LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 9(A)(1)–(2), 12, 25.
The City of New Orleans court also recognized that local ordinances may not be
applied in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory manner. 640 So. 2d at 255.
209. 640 So. 2d at 254.
210. See generally Gerald S. Janoff, Comment, City of New Orleans v. Board
of Commissioners: The Louisiana Supreme Court Frees New Orleans from the
Shackles of Dillon’s Rule, 69 TUL. L. REV. 809 (1995).
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arguably are less than necessary to protect state interests that may be less
than vital.211
For example, in the post-City of New Orleans case, Morial v. Smith &
Wesson Corp.,212 the Louisiana Supreme Court sustained a state law that
prohibited local governments from suing a slew of gun manufacturers for
damages related to the sale of firearms.213 Rather than asking whether the
state interest was “vital” or whether the state legislation was “necessary” in
light of available alternatives, the court asked the rather deferential question
of whether the state law represented a reasonable and valid exercise of the
police power.214 The Smith & Wesson court concluded that statewide
regulation of the firearms industry “tends” towards preserving public safety
and welfare.215 In his dissent, Chief Justice Calogero argued that, not only
did the state law fail to even attempt to prevent an evil or preserve public
health or welfare, but the law also harmed public welfare by restricting the
public’s right to recover damages for injury.216
Later, in New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New
Orleans,217 the Louisiana Supreme Court found that a Louisiana statute that
prohibited a local governmental subdivision from establishing a minimum
wage preempted a minimum wage amendment to the City of New Orleans’
charter.218 The majority opinion, written by Justice Kimball, diverged
widely from the principles that Justice Dennis laid down in City of New
Orleans. First, Justice Kimball stated that the Louisiana Constitution does
not differentiate between pre-1974 and post-1974 home rule charters on the
issue of the abridgement of the state’s police power.219 Second, Justice
Kimball stated that the relevant test should ask whether the legislature’s
exercise of the police power was reasonable, giving great weight to the
legislature’s determination and refusing to substitute the court’s opinion for
the opinion of the legislature.220 Chief Justice Calogero, in concurrence,
would have struck down the local law as violating the prohibition against
211. See, e.g., City of Baton Rouge v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311, 1318–19 (La. 1995).
212. 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001). For a detailed discussion of Morial, see Eric
Womack, Comment, A Revolution in Local Government Law: Recognizing the
Home Rule Implications of Municipality Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 5
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 255 (2001).
213. 785 So. 2d at 19.
214. Id. at 15.
215. Id. at 16.
216. Id. at 21.
217. 825 So. 2d 1098 (La. 2002).
218. Id. at 1108.
219. Id. at 1105.
220. Id.
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regulation of private relationships,221 and Justice Johnson, in dissent, would
have allowed the local law to stand.222 Both of these two justices, however,
recognized that the majority marginalized any distinction between pre-1974
and post-1974 home rule local governments.223
The reasonableness test as used to measure the state’s power to preempt
local government under the “nonabridgement” clause of the 1974
Constitution actually originated 10 years before Justice Dennis formulated the
necessary and vital test in City of New Orleans. In Francis v. Morial,224 the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered a state statute that required the two
cities and a parish to choose members of the Louisiana aviation board.225
The Francis court stated that it would sustain state legislation against
conflicting local law if the operation of the state law “tends in some degree
to prevent an offense or evil or otherwise to preserve public health, morals,
safety or welfare . . . .”226 The state law nevertheless was struck down in that
case largely because that law affected the governance of the home rule city,
which is a direct affront to the concept of home rule power.227
The judiciary continues to be suspicious of state laws that abridge the
governance or structure of home rule local governments.228 In the realm of
zoning and police power regulation, however, Louisiana courts have
afforded state laws considerable deference despite City of New Orleans.229
221. Id. at 1108–09 (Calogero, J., concurring in the decree, dissenting from the
majority’s reasons).
222. Id. at 1124–25 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 1110 (Calogero, J., concurring in the decree but dissenting from
the majority’s reasons) (“Similarly, the judiciary in deciding whether a local
government’s legislation abridges the state’s police power must do more than
merely rely on the legislature’s pronouncement that a matter is true ‘statewide’
concern . . . . To accept such a statement at face value would effectively place
pre–1974 home rule charter cities on the same constitutional footing as post–1974
cities, insofar as the legislature’s ability to override local legislation by simply
passing an inconsistent ‘general’ law.”); id. at 1123–24 (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(“The questions we must resolve are these: Does [the state statute] protect a vital
or compelling state interest? If so, can that state interest be achieved through less
drastic alternatives?”).
224. 455 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1984).
225. Id. at 1170.
226. Id. at 1172–73 (emphasis added).
227. See id. at 1174.
228. The 1974 Constitution states that a home rule charter shall provide “the
structure and organization, powers, and functions” of the local government. LA.
CONST. art. VI, § 5(E).
229. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dirs. of the La. State Museum,
739 So. 2d 748 (La. 1999) (holding that Vieux Carre Commission of New Orleans
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The state law could favor a particular industry to the alleged detriment of
public welfare and safety, as in the case of Smith & Wesson, or the state law
could simply conflict with local laws.
In a few cases since City of New Orleans, however, Louisiana courts
have protected local power in the face of potentially conflicting state
statutes.230 For example, in St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. Riverboat
Gaming Commission,231 decided a year after City of New Orleans, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance that restricted
riverboat gaming activity was not invalid on its face.232 The State Riverboat
Gaming Commission issued a permit to the plaintiff to conduct gambling
operations at a specific site on the batture233 and sued the parish council to
enjoin the parish from enforcing its zoning ordinance.234 In effect, the court
recognized the distinction between process and land use. It distinguished
between gambling, which is regulated by the legislature, and zoning, which
is a valid activity of the local government that was not denied by the state
legislature.235
As noted above, the Louisiana Constitution states that it protects local
governments from state legislative action except by general state laws that
deny local authority, rather than merely conflict with local law.236 In the
context of oil and gas production, Louisiana Revised Statutes section
30:28(F) denies local authority with respect to permitted oil and gas wells.237
acted unreasonably in requiring state to comply with permit procedures); Merritt
McDonald Constr., Inc. v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 742 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App.
1999) (striking down contractor licensure requirements of home rule parish as
conflicting with state licensure requirements).
230. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dirs. of the La. State Museum,
709 So. 2d 1008 (La. Ct. App. 1998), vacated by 739 So. 2d 748. The Court of
Appeal required the state to comply with the city’s permitting procedure, but the
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the city abridged the state’s police power.
739 So. 2d at 758.
231. 648 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1995).
232. Id. at 1312.
233. A “batture” is “[s]oil, stone, or other material that builds under water and
may or may not break the surface.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 173 (9th ed.
2009).
234. St. Charles Gaming, 648 So. 2d at 1312.
235. Id. at 1317.
236. City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Orleans Levee Dist., 640
So. 2d 237, 248 (La. 1994).
237. “No other agency or political subdivision of the state shall have the
authority, and they are hereby expressly forbidden, to prohibit or in any way
interfere with the drilling of a well or test well in search of minerals by the holder
of such a permit.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(F) (2007).
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Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:4780.49 also denies the local
authority of parishes, but not municipalities, over activities authorized under
state or federal permits.238 Local governments might argue, based on the
distinction between process and land use, that the purpose of the preemption
statute relates only to the technical operations of oil and gas wells and that
zoning ordinances do not implicate those operations. To succeed based on
such an argument would require a strong presumption in favor of local
authority. However, such a presumption appears to have eroded somewhat
since City of New Orleans. The Francis standard asks little more than
whether a conflicting state law is a general law. Although this is the test
applicable to most legislative home rule local governments, it hardly sets
Louisiana apart as a home rule innovator.
V. PROCESS AND LAND USE OVERLAP IN THE OIL AND GAS CONTEXT
The ideal level of local autonomy over the location of oil and gas wells
has been the subject of scholarly interest. For example, in a recent article,
Professor David Spence cogently argued that allowing local governments to
veto fracking or drilling may result in more optimal utility and reach the
most efficient outcome, but only “if local governments can capture more of
the benefits of production” in the form of impact or other fees or additional
taxes.239 Although costs and benefits of production usually are shared statewide, thus favoring state-level preemption, Professor Spence argues that to
maximize collective utility, one should take into account not just the
preferences of state residents in the aggregate, but also the intensity of
preferences, which may be stronger at the local level.240
In response to Professor Spence, Professor Fershee makes perhaps the
most important point in the debate: that states do retain the ability to decide
whether local governments may ban fracking or drilling by preemption and
that courts should and usually do respect those policy choices.241 Even when
a state legislature acts to preempt local government actions, however, the
legislature must be very clear. At least in the context of fracking, courts
recently have tended to protect local power in the absence of legislative
238. “[N]o [parish] shall . . . restrict, conflict with, interfere with, or supersede
activities operating in accordance with authorized state or federal permits, laws,
or regulations.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.49 (2009).
239. David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV.
351, 353 (2014).
240. Id. at 412.
241. Joshua P. Fershee, How Local is Local?: A Response to Professor David
B. Spence’s The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 61, 62–63
(2015).
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clarity, particularly in their recognition of the distinction between process
and land use.242
There are a number of arguments, however, why the state, rather than
the local government, should be the ultimate decision maker as to when and
where drilling should occur.243 For example, local governments may be
more subject to interest group pressure than state governments, which must
take into account a broader range of interests. Local governments may also
fail to account for the interests of underrepresented mineral owners. This
problem arises in part because surface owners, renters, and other nonmineral owning residents—the large majority of voters to whom local
politicians must be responsive—realize very little of the economic benefits
of production in their neighborhood.244 Local bans create free-rider
problems,245 particularly in states where oil and gas operations generate the
majority of revenues and other economic benefits that are distributed more
evenly throughout the state. In contrast, local governments bear the vast
majority of externality costs246 from truck traffic, noise, boom and bust
cycles, etc.247 These governments may benefit economically from local
employment and local taxes, but a large portion of the economic benefits
generated in a local government jurisdiction that allows oil and gas
production often flows to residents of other sub-state entities.248
Perhaps most persuasive, however, is that process and land use overlap
in the oil and gas context, meaning that where oil and gas is produced also
implicates how and whether oil and gas will be produced and whether it will
be fairly allocated.
Scholars and courts generally recognize the distinction between land
use as a local interest and process as a state interest. For example, Louisiana
State University Law Professor Kenneth Murchison has advised against
preemption where the purpose of state regulation is to govern processes and
practices, rather than the type of comprehensive planning that is the subject
242. See Ritchie, supra note 83; see generally Kramer, supra note 6.
243. See Alex Ritchie, On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in
New Mexico, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 299 (2014).
244. Id. at 297–98.
245. Free-rider problems arise when market participants enjoy the benefits
associated with a public good without having to pay their fair share for the good.
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 109 (1988).
246. An externality may be described as a cost or benefit that is not internalized
by the applicable actor, in this case the oil and gas industry. NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD
& CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS:
RECLAIMING THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA 132 (2008).
247. Ritchie, supra note 243, at 282–83.
248. Id. at 285–87.
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of sound zoning practices.249 In the Palermo case, the local government
down-zoned the land of the defendants—who intended to sell their parcels
for a solid waste landfill—from heavy industrial to light industrial, which
prohibited the intended use for the land and precluded its sale.250 The
defendants pointed to state environmental regulation, but the court found no
provisions that expressly preempted the local zoning regulation. In fact,
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”) regulations
required that the proposed use could not violate local land use requirements
as a precondition to obtaining a solid waste disposal permit.251 The Palermo
court then discussed whether the Louisiana statutory scheme impliedly
preempted the local regulation, finding that the focus of the Office of Solid
and Hazardous Waste was to regulate “solid waste disposal practices,” not
zoning.252 In other words, the practice of solid waste disposal was a process
appropriately regulated by the state, not land use.
The dividing line under the law, however, is not so precise where oil
and gas wells are concerned. In the implied preemption context, it is often
stated that a local law is preempted when the state law allows something the
local law prohibits, and vice versa.253 The language of this test, however,
provides only a theoretical degree of certainty. A drilling permit is an
authorization to drill in a particular location, and a local zoning ordinance
may prohibit drilling in that very same location. Jurisdictions without an
express preemption provision—and at least one jurisdiction with an express
preemption provision254—allow this direct conflict under the rationale that
the purpose of local land use is very different from the purpose of state
conservation statutes.
Courts routinely distinguish between the purpose of state conservation
statutes and the purpose of local land use ordinances. Land use concerns
the preservation of the character of neighborhoods and furthers the
comprehensive plans of the local government.255 By contrast, state
conservation statutes are focused primarily on the prevention of waste of
249. Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, 52 LA. L. REV. 541, 552
(1992).
250. Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So. 2d
482, 484 (La. 1990).
251. Id. at 498 (citing LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, pt. 6, § 1107(B)(1)).
252. 561 So. 2d at 498 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2152 (2000)).
253. Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 896 N.E.2d 967, 971
(Ohio 2008); Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 862
(Pa. 2009); Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 199 P.3d 718, 725
(Colo. 2009).
254. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part III.A.
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oil and gas and the protection of correlative rights. Unfortunately, however,
these purposes overlap in the oil and gas context in a way that justifies a
degree of state preemptive power over local restrictions on the location of
wells.
“Waste” of oil and gas is defined to include physical waste and
economic waste. Physical waste may result from inefficient use of reservoir
energy or excessive production rates. Economic waste may result from
drilling more wells than are required or when oil or gas is sold at too low a
price.256 By contrast, “correlative rights” is a term that describes acceptable
standards of conduct for operations in a common source of supply,
recognizing that actions of one producer have an effect on the rights of
others.257 In Louisiana, correlative rights of a mineral owner include the
opportunity to produce a fair share of the common reservoir, and the right
to utilize natural reservoir energy.258 Correlative rights also prohibit a person
operating in a common reservoir from intentionally or negligently depriving
another owner in the common reservoir of his rights or negligently causing
him harm.259
The conservation agency may protect these correlative rights using any
number of tools, including the allocation of allowable production in a
common pool,260 and the establishment of drilling units in a manner that
allows a producer to produce no more than his just and equitable share of
the pool.261 Although the primary duty of the conservation agency is to
prevent waste to promote the full and efficient development of the state’s
mineral resources,262 the agency also has the power and duty to protect
256. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1133 (13th ed. 2012). Some states, including
Louisiana, define waste only by reference to physical waste. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30:3 (2007) (“‘Waste’, in addition to its ordinary meanings, means
‘physical waste’ as that term is generally understood in the oil and gas industry.”).
257. See Eugene E. Kuntz, Correlative Rights of Parties Owning Interest in a
Common Source of Supply of Oil or Gas, 17 INST. OIL & GAS LAW & TAX’N 217,
224–25 (1966).
258. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:9 & cmt. (2000).
259. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:10.
260. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:11.
261. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9(A). The conservation agency’s power to
establish drilling units to protect the source of the supply for the common owners
is a constitutional exercise of the state’s police powers. See Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209–11 (1899); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495,
506 (La. 1942).
262. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2 to :4; Exxon Corp. v. Thompson, 564
So. 2d 387, 394 (La. Ct. App. 1990). The duty to protect correlative rights is
addressed differently in different state conservation statutes. For example, in
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correlative rights, and more generally, to make any reasonable rule,
regulation, or order necessary to administer and enforce the conservation
law.263
In Matter of Wallach, the New York Court of Appeals in part based its
decision to allow local oil and gas bans on the distinction between the
purposes under state conservation law of waste prevention and correlative
rights protection and the local purposes of zoning and land use.264 The court
states that “[t]he [oil and gas law’s] overriding concern with preventing
waste is limited to inefficient or improper drilling activities that result in the
unnecessary waste of natural resources. Nothing in the statute points to the
conclusion that a municipality’s decision not to permit drilling equates to
waste.”265 Thus, according to the New York Court of Appeals, oil and gas
that is still in the ground is not wasted, at least under the statutory meaning
of the conservation laws. With little elaboration, the court similarly
concluded that correlative rights are not implicated by the inability of an
owner within a jurisdiction to drill at all.266 Drilling bans, however, cause
waste and implicate correlative rights, particularly because of the
extraterritorial effects.
As the Colorado Supreme Court observed in Voss v. Lundvall Brothers,
Inc.,267 a municipal ban may increase the cost of drilling when the pool of
oil or gas may be accessed only from outside the jurisdiction, which results
in economic waste.268 A ban may also result in physical waste. Drilling
permits are issued by the state at locations intended to maximize production.
If oil and gas is only produced outside the jurisdiction that bans production,
it may be produced in an inefficient pattern or significant oil and gas might
be left in the ground. The Voss court recognized that a ban also prevents
owners inside the jurisdiction of the local government from producing their
equitable share of oil and gas from the pool.269 When a pool is located both
inside and outside the particular local government that bans production, the

Colorado, the definition of “waste” includes abuse of correlative rights. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(13)(c) (2006). In New York, the purpose of the conservation
law expressly includes both the prevention of waste and the full protection of
correlative rights. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2007).
263. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:4(C) (2007 & Supp. 2015).
264. In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1201–02 (N.Y. 2014).
265. Id. at 1196.
266. Id. at 1200 n.5.
267. 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).
268. Id. at 1067.
269. Id. at 1068.
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owner located outside the jurisdiction may drain the entire pool under the
rule of capture.270
The applicable remedy under the rule of capture is for the owner to drill
his or her own well to offset the drainage from the property.271 That remedy,
however, is unavailable to the owner located inside the jurisdiction of the
local government where drilling is banned, frustrating the rule that is the
foundation of oil and gas law.272 The owner within the jurisdiction is thus
denied the opportunity to produce its fair and equitable share or any share at
all. In other words, the owner is denied its correlative rights in direct
contravention of conservation statutes.273
Relying on Voss, other Colorado courts have reached the same
conclusion. In the summer of 2014, the Boulder District Court274 and the
Larimer County District Court275 each recognized that a municipal ban on
fracking causes waste and impairs correlative rights. The United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, in striking down the Mora
County, New Mexico, oil and gas production and storage ban, also found
270. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13
(Tex. 2008) (“[The] rule [of capture] gives a mineral rights owner title to the oil
and gas produced from a lawful well bottomed on the property, even if the oil and
gas flowed to the well from beneath another owner’s tract.”).
271. Id. at 14.
272. See id. at 14 n.41 (“[T]he owner of the adjoining tract from which the oil
is migrating can protect himself by drilling offset wells. This equal right to drill
has always supported the constitutionality of the rule of capture. Take it away and
the reason for the rule fails, leaving a result not only unjust but one inconsistent
with the fundamental concept of ownership of oil and gas in place as a part of the
realty.” (quoting Ryan Consol. Petrol. Corp. v. Pickens, 285 S.W.2d 201, 210
(Tex. 1955) (Wilson, J., dissenting))).
273. See Ritchie, supra note 243, at 310–11.
274. See Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Colo. Oil & Gas
Ass’n v. City of Lafayette, 2014 WL 7666285 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2014) (No.
13CV31746) [hereinafter Lafayette Order]; Order Granting Motions for Summary
Judgment at 13, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, 2014 WL 3690665
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 2014) (No. 13CV63) [hereinafter Longmont Order]. Interestingly,
correlative rights were impaired in Longmont because a unit was formed that
included acreage inside and outside Longmont, but the oil and gas company was
not allowed to frack the portion of the well inside Longmont. Under state law,
owners of mineral interests were thus allocated proceeds from the production of
the well based on their percentage ownership of the unit but were not actually
contributing acreage to the well. Longmont Order, supra, at 13.
275. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on First Claim
for Relief and Denying Defendant’s Cross-Motion of Summary Judgment at 5–6,
Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Ft. Collins, 2014 WL 7666284 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
2014) (No. 13CV31385) [hereinafter Ft. Collins Order].
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that such a ban frustrates the state conservation law purposes of waste
prevention and correlative rights protection, as well as the overall statutory
scheme regulating oil and gas.276 Interestingly, all of these courts also
recognized that the state statutory scheme left room for reasonable zoning
and land use restrictions.
Arguably, any zoning or other restrictions on where wells might be
located may impair correlative rights or result in waste. Even a traditional
zoning pattern that separates uses into districts may prohibit drilling at the
most efficient and effective location for production or deny one or more
owners their just and equitable share of production. Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 30:28(F) and the EMC 1 court’s interpretation of that statute
address that reality.
VI. COMPROMISE AND PARTICIPATION AS ALTERNATIVES
TO LOCAL CONTROL
As argued above, policy should vest the state with the ultimate decisionmaking authority as to the where and how wells are drilled and completed.
Local governments and their citizenry, however, should have their
legitimate concerns heard and considered, even in circumstances where all
such concerns cannot be addressed to their satisfaction. Industry itself may
give voice to at least some local concerns through direct negotiation and
compromise or more passively by not legally challenging reasonable local
regulations. At the state level, local citizens are given a voice when the LOC
considers their concerns in balancing environmental costs and benefits along
with economic, social, and other factors in making permitting decisions.
Although the state might be unresponsive to such environmental
considerations in the absence of a mandate, the Louisiana Constitution
arguably provides such a mandate. This Part discusses these opportunities
for a local voice in the absence of local control.
A. Cooperative Governance or Compromise
Some commentators have called for cooperation between local
governments and industry or between state and local governments in the
siting and permitting of wells.277 Cooperation implies working together
276. SWEPI, LP v. Mora Cnty., No. CIV 14–0035 JB/SCY, 2015 WL 365923,
at *102–03 (D.N.M. Jan. 19, 2015).
277. See John R. Nolan & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption,
Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995, 1036–
39 (2013). Professor Nolan and his former student argue that state agencies could
assist communities by providing technical assistance. They also describe a system
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towards an end,278 which will usually prove difficult between oil and gas
companies that want to drill at efficient locations and communities that want
to ban oil and gas drilling entirely. Cooperation in such circumstances might
be better termed “mutually beneficial compromise.”
To achieve compromise, both parties must feel at least some pressure to
negotiate. Compromise may be more difficult in Louisiana than in other oiland-gas-producing states because of the preeminent authority of the LOC to
regulate both process and location under EMC 1 and EMC 2. Even so, at
least some local regulation may co-exist with state regulation, even in a state
such as Louisiana with a strong express preemption provision. One can
expect oil and gas companies to voluntarily comply with reasonable
restrictions to avoid jeopardizing their social license to operate in the
community.279 In this respect, cooperation in Louisiana by the state and
industry with local governments to craft reasonable local regulation is not
impossible.
Former Caddo Parish Attorney Charles C. Grubb explains the story of
how Caddo Parish regulated oil and gas operations in the face of increased
drilling in the Haynesville Shale.280 After considering Louisiana’s preemption
statute, Caddo Parish decided to take an expansive view of its regulatory
authority while avoiding regulations that proscribe well locations or that
regulate the process of drilling, stimulating, or completing a well—referred
to as “down-hole” regulation.281 Instead, Caddo Parish regulates matters
such as site access, dust, vibration, lighting, exhaust fumes, signage, use of
public water supplies, discharges, aesthetics, operating hours, noise, and
road usage.282
In crafting its oil and gas ordinances, Caddo Parish involved industry in
discussions. In the view of Caddo Parish, industry would not risk
confrontation with communities to challenge reasonable regulations that the
in New York relating to the siting of major electric generating facilities that
provides for preemption of local control but allows for local input. Id. at 1038.
278. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (9th ed. 2009).
279. See Kieren Moffat & Airong Zhang, The Paths to Social License to
Operate: An Integrative Model Explaining Community Acceptance of Mining, 39
RESOURCES POL’Y 61, 61 (2014).
280. Charles C. Grubb, Getting Ahead of Drilling Companies in the Haynesville
Shale, The Caddo Parish, Louisiana, Experience, in BEYOND THE FRACKING WARS:
A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PLANNERS, AND CITIZENS 213, 213–20
(Erica L. Powers & Beth E. Kinne eds., 2013).
281. Id. at 215–17.
282. See, e.g., CADDO PARISH, LA., POLICE JURY CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 341 to 34-55 (2009) (oil, gas, and hydrocarbon wells); id. §§ 26-155 to 26-162
(commercial vehicle enforcement); id. §§ 32-160 to 32-166 (noise).
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public supports.283 Grubb also reported that the LDNR and the
Commissioner of Conservation worked cooperatively with the Parish.284
Due to these efforts, Grubb reports that the citizens of Caddo Parish have
enjoyed the economic benefits attendant with Haynesville Shale production
without significant harm to the environment.285
Bossier Parish,286 the City of Bossier,287 DeSoto Parish,288 the City of
Shreveport,289 and probably many other local governments in Louisiana all
regulate certain aspects of oil and gas operations either directly or indirectly
through local ordinances.290 One can expect the trend of locally regulating
oil and gas operations in the Haynesville Shale, which began in 2009, to
spread to the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale area as that area is further
developed.291
Further, the state should be willing to voluntarily appease local
governments to some extent when officials believe they can avoid the
political risk of local opposition while also limiting the impact on their
authority. For example, in Colorado, local government frustration led to
Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper’s creation of an oil and gas task
force to address concerns of local governments. The task force submitted
nine proposals to the Governor, two of which require legislation, and the
remainder of which can be implemented by agency regulation.292 One
283. Grubb, supra note 280, at 217.
284. Id. at 222.
285. Id. at 223.
286. See, e.g., BOSSIER PARISH, LA., POLICE JURY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9410 (2013) (commercial vehicle enforcement); id. §§ 46-34 to 46-41 (noise).
287. See, e.g., BOSSIER CITY, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 46-141 to 46-147
(2009) (gas and other hydrocarbon well operations).
288. See, e.g., DESOTO PARISH, LA., POLICE JURY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 789 (2010) (requiring the repair of excess damage to roads by motor vehicles,
including for the drilling of oil or gas wells).
289. See, e.g., SHREVEPORT, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 251-1 to 25-31
(2009) (oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon well operations); id. § 25-29 (noise).
290. See Jerry N. Jones, Local Regulation in Louisiana’s Haynesville Shale,
BRADLEY, MURCHISON, KELLY, & SHEA LLC, http://www.bradleyfirm.com/files
/shale.pps [perma.cc/RKB6-N8EL] (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
291. As of February 22, 2015, the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale contained only 37
active wells. See Tuscaloosa Marine Shale Map, LA. DEP’T NATURAL RES.,
http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=909
[perma.cc/4PDS-NPSZ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
292. See Mark Jaffe, Colorado Oil, Gas Task Force Sends 9 Measures on to
Governor’s Desk, DENVER POST (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.denverpost.com
/business/ci_27592566/colorado-oil-gas-task-force-sends-9-measures [perma.cc/7JK
W-XVNJ].
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proposal limits the impact of large-scale operations on multi-well drilling
pads and gives local governments the right to negotiate the location of such
sites.293 Another proposal requires oil and gas companies to provide
forward-looking information about their development plans to local
governments to facilitate local land use planning.294 Other proposals add
inspection staff, require a study of oil and gas vehicle traffic, and create a
statewide information clearinghouse.295 Overall, the proposals give local
governments more of a consulting role and even more of a right to
participate in the planning process, but leave final permitting decisions to
the state.296
B. Local Participation in the Drilling Decision: The Natural Resources
Article to the Louisiana Constitution
In addition to the challenges brought against the state and Helis with
respect to the proposed well in St. Tammany Parish,297 Abita Springs
brought suit against the LOC, arguing that the LOC failed to adequately
address article IX, section 1 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution—the
Natural Resources Article298—in its findings and decision to grant a drilling
293. KEYSTONE CENTER, COLORADO OIL AND GAS TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT
5 (2015), available at http://dnr.state.co.us/OGTASKFORCE/Pages/home.aspx
[perma.cc/8FCM-6QAD].
294. Id. at 9.
295. See id. at 12, 16, 17.
296. Colorado’s willingness to work with local governments, however, has not
been a panacea for environmental activists. The Governor created the task force as
a political compromise to ward off amendments to the Colorado Constitution that
would have overturned court preemption decisions and allowed local governments
the right to ban oil and gas production. See Lynn Bartels, Let’s Make a Deal: How
Colorado Came to a Fracking Compromise, DENVER POST (Aug. 23, 2014),
http://www.denverpost.com/election2014/ci_26394883/lets-make-deal-how-colora
do-came-fracking-compromise [perma.cc/8ZQV-J7C3]. Environmental activists
are not happy with the proposals, and have vowed to go back to the ballot initiative
process if local governments are not given the right to ban oil and gas production in
their communities. See Dan Boyce, Task Force Proposes Fracking Rules to
Colorado Governor, NPR (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/02/27/3894
54418/task-force-proposes-fracking-rules-to-colorado-governor [perma.cc/YT4G66TW].
297. See supra Part I.
298. The Natural Resources Article states: “The natural resources of the state,
including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of
the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible
and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature
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permit to Helis.299 On August 10, 2015, District Judge Timothy Kelley ruled
for Abita Springs, vacating the drilling permit and remanding to the LOC to
specifically address dangers associated with the existence of a fault line near
the drilling site, a cost benefit analysis, and an alternative site analysis.300 If
the recent victory of Abita Springs in the 19th Judicial District Court stands,
that decision will be a significant development for local communities. The
decision appears to mitigate the harsh implications for local governments of
total preemption under EMC 1 and EMC 2.
In Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control
Commission,301 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that this Natural
Resources Article imposes a duty on the legislature and on all state
government agencies to protect the environment.302 But the environment is
not considered in isolation of other important public policies. The court stated
that the “insofar as possible” language created a rule of reasonableness that
requires agencies to balance economic, social, and other factors along with
environmental costs and benefits. To conduct this balancing, an agency must
actually analyze adverse environmental impacts in advance, before granting a
permit, to determine that those impacts “have been minimized or avoided as
much as possible consistently with the public welfare.”303
shall enact laws to implement this policy.” LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis
added). The public trust concept in the 1974 Louisiana Constitution was continued
from the 1921 Louisiana Constitution, which provided: “The natural resources of
the State shall be protected, conserved and replenished.” LA. CONST. art. VI, § 1
(1921).
299. Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Judicial Review at 12, Town of Abita
Springs v. Welsh, No. 637209 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2015).
300. Oral Reasons for Judgment on Exceptions Filed on Behalf of Town of
Abita Springs for Judicial Review, Objections to Administrative Record Filed on
Behalf of Town of Abita Springs, and Oral Argument, Town of Abita Springs v.
Welsh, No. 637209 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Oral Reasons to Vacate Helis Permit].
301. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
302. Id. at 1156. The Natural Resources Article does not expressly refer to
government agencies but does expressly obligate the legislature. As such, the Save
Ourselves court could have reasonably decided that the Natural Resources Article
only obligates the legislature to enact affirmative environmental protection
legislation, an obligation it has met by enactment inter alia of the Environmental
Affairs Act, No. 449, 1979 La. Acts 1256, which was amended and renamed the
Environmental Quality Act in 1983. Act No. 97, 1983 La. Acts 270; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2001 to :2588 (2000). Instead, however, the court held that the
Natural Resources article was a self-effectuating mandate that imposes a trust duty
of environmental protection on all state agencies.
303. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1156–57.
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The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in Blackett v. Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality summarized the factors—known as
the “IT Factors”—that agencies bestowed with the public trust duty must
specifically consider.304 The same court then refined the factors again in In
the Matter of Rubicon, Inc.305 Under the IT Factors, findings of fact and
reasons for decisions must show whether:
1) [T]he potential and real adverse environmental effects of the
proposed project have been avoided to the maximum extent
possible; 2) a cost benefit analysis of the environmental impact
costs balanced against the social and economic benefits of the
project demonstrate that the latter outweighs the former; and 3)
there are alternative projects or alternative sites or mitigating
measures which would offer more protection to the environment
than the proposed project without unduly curtailing nonenvironmental benefits to the extent applicable.306
Save Ourselves indicates that the LDEQ is “the primary public trustee
of natural resources and the environment in protecting [the public] from
hazardous waste pollution . . . .”307 All Louisiana appellate decisions that
have considered the Natural Resources Article have involved attacks against
decisions of the LDEQ, primarily in disputes involving waste disposal
facilities.308 To better ensure compliance with Louisiana Supreme Court and
Louisiana First Circuit holdings, in 1996 the legislature enacted Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:2018. The statute requires an applicant for a
permit from LDEQ for hazardous wastes, solid wastes, water pollutants, or
air emissions to submit an environmental assessment document that
addresses the IT Factors verbatim from In re Rubicon.309 If requested, the
LDEQ must conduct a public hearing on the environmental assessment.310
304. 506 So. 2d 749, 753–54 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
305. 670 So. 2d 475 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
306. Id. at 483.
307. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1157.
308. See, e.g., Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d 1152 (hazardous waste disposal
facility); Blackett, 506 So. 2d 749 (solid waste disposal facility); In re Rubicon,
670 So. 2d 475 (deep well injection hazardous waste disposal); see also In re
Browning-Ferris Indus. Petit Bois Landfill, 657 So. 2d 633 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
(solid waste disposal facility); In re Shreveport Sanitary & Indus. Landfill, 521
So. 2d 710 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (sanitary landfill); Citizens Against Multi-Chem
v. Dep’t Envtl. Quality, 145 So. 3d 471 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (chemical distribution
facility).
309. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2018(A)–(B) (2000).
310. Id. at § 30:2018(C).
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Applications for “minor” sources of air emissions, hazardous or solid
wastes, or water discharges are not subject to the statute, although the statute
states that “[n]othing in this Section shall relieve permit applicants or the
department from the public trustee requirements” in the Natural Resources
Article or Save Ourselves.311
Appellate decisions have focused on the LDEQ as the “primary
protector” agency, but in its case against the LOC, Abita Springs cited
several district court decisions that required the LDNR to consider the IT
Factors.312 The decision of Judge Kelly, however, appears to be the first
decision relating to a drilling permit that the LOC issued. The LOC chose
not to make the interesting argument that the IT Factors are wholly
inapplicable to decisions of the LDNR. The LOC could have argued, for
example, that by enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:2018, the
legislature determined that the LDEQ is the agency responsible for
enforcing the Save Ourselves requirements. Further, the LOC could have
contended that, by not enacting similar provisions applicable to the LDNR,
the legislature inferred that LDNR permitting actions are not the type of
actions that have possible environmental impacts significant enough to
warrant imposition of the IT Factors.313 The LOC did argue that mineral
development is different than a waste or saltwater disposal facility. Its
position, however, was essentially that the LOC had no choice but to permit
the well because drilling may occur only where minerals are located, and
the right to explore for and produce minerals is something Louisiana “takes
very seriously.”314 Thus, under the LOC’s argument, perfunctory
conclusions satisfy the IT Factor analysis in the case of a drilling permit.315
The LOC took much more evidence in the Abita Springs case as to
potential environmental harms than it normally takes because the parties
311. Id. at § 30:2018(E), (H). Minor sources are defined by LDEQ rules. Id. at (G).
312. Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Judicial Review at 13–14, Town of Abita
Springs v. Welsh, No. 637209 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2015). Abita Springs cited no
cases relating to the granting of a drilling permit.
313. The LOC did state in the order itself that the IT Factors were not
applicable to drilling permits. La. Office of Conservation, Order No. 1577-1, 9
(Dec. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Drilling Permit Order].
314. Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant’s Petition for Judicial Review
at 14–15, Town of Abita Springs v. Welsh, No. 637209 (La. Dist. Ct. July 17,
2015) [hereinafter LOC Opposition Memo]. The LOC also argued, inter alia, that
the Natural Resources Article does not require that the LOC spell out obvious
conclusions that should be inferred from the findings in the LOC’s drilling permit
order. Id. at 15, 17.
315. See id. at 13 (“Conservation did not believe that the law required it to
explain the obvious: Louisiana law establishing mineral rights and common sense
as to where these minerals are located.”).
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presented significant evidence in testimony at the hearing to consider the
Helis permit and in comments, including an expert report from a consultant
that the Town hired.316 If courts hold the LOC and its permit applicants to
the same standard as the LDEQ and its applicants under Save Ourselves, one
may wonder whether the LOC persistently violated the Natural Resources
Article in other cases that lacked much evidence of potential environmental
risks. Consider that to support its position that fracking beneath the Southern
Hills Aquifer in St. Tammany Parish is safe, the LOC noted that oil and gas
companies had already drilled 73 oil and gas wells in St. Tammany Parish,
124 oil and gas wells into the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale, and over 27,000
hydraulically fractured wells in Louisiana.317 Presumably, these permitted
wells did not receive the same scrutiny as the Helis well.
Now that the IT Factors have been applied to a drilling permit, local
governments may have a new avenue to voice their concerns in permitting
actions that present complex environmental problems, but they must be
prepared. They must engage counsel and experts, request a hearing, raise
their issues at the hearing and in comments, and bring legal action to
challenge decisions for which they disagree. And for a number of reasons,
Save Ourselves and its progeny do not promise that courts will examine
potential environmental impacts in all cases where a decision of the LOC
may have a negative impact on the human environment.318
First, courts do not need to assess and balance environmental impacts
under the Natural Resources Article unless parties raised them on the record
of the administrative proceeding. The Louisiana First Circuit has held that
an agency only needs to conduct the IT Factor analysis in “contested case[s]
involving complex issues.”319 Second, even though a court may force an
agency to better document its findings as to its cost-benefit analysis or its
consideration of alternatives, courts may be reluctant to require the agency
to conduct additional hearings or take additional evidence.320
Third, like reviews conducted by the federal government under the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),321 the courts applying the
316. See Drilling Permit Order, supra note 313, at 4–8.
317. LOC Opposition Memo, supra note 314, at 16.
318. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2014); cf. Nat’l Envtl. Pol’y Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(C) (2012).
319. In re Rubicon, Inc., 670 So. 2d 475, 486 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (Fogg, J.,
dissenting). This limitation no longer applies to LDEQ major source permitting
actions. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
320. See, e.g., Oral Reasons to Vacate Helis Permit, supra note 300, at 5.
321. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
228 (1980) (stating NEPA requires no more than that the agency consider the
environmental consequences of its decision).
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Natural Resources Article appear more concerned with documentation and
disclosure than with the substantive permitting decision that the agency
made.322 Unlike NEPA, the Natural Resources Article contains a substantive
standard that requires an agency to make decisions that protect the
environment, at least insofar as possible. But when one factors the balancing
aspect of Save Ourselves together with the discretion afforded the agency,
the outcome of any decision-making process may be largely predetermined.
This is not to say, however, that challenges cannot result in positive
substantive environmental mitigation. Due to community outrage and the
challenges by St. Tammany Parish and the Town of Abita Springs to the
Helis drilling permit, Helis voluntarily proposed extensive mitigation
measures for its well that the LOC incorporated into the permit.323 In its
reexamination of the Helis permit after remand by the district court, the LOC
could decide to impose additional mitigation measures to support its
permitting decision and to avoid further appeals.
Fourth, the IT Factors provide little guidance to both agencies and
interested persons as to the level of detail required of reviews and findings by
administrative agencies. Further, the courts have given agencies mixed
messages. In one case, the First Circuit said that the agency complies with
its public trustee duty only by “detailing its reasoning . . . .”324 In an earlier
case, however, the same court said that an order is not invalid if its findings
and reasons are “implicit in the record” or “self-evident,” which supports
the LOC position in the Abita Springs case.325 In this sense, the legislature
should consider its obligation to “enact laws to implement” the article by
developing more detailed standards to guide the agency decision-making
process.
Finally, many local governments may object to the siting of wells but
may be hesitant to incur the costs to participate in the permitting process
until a local government or citizens’ group wins an appeal to one of the state
appellate courts. The LOC argued in the Abita Springs case that the Natural
Resources Article has little to no application to the LOC because of the
“obvious” facts that the technology is proven and minerals must be produced
where they are located.326 In the Abita Springs case, the LOC may choose
to simply comply with Judge Kelley’s order instead of appealing, and then
argue again in future cases in reliance on the jurisprudence constante
322. See, e.g., In re Rubicon, 670 So. 2d at 483 (remanding case to agency for
the issuance of findings to support exemption from disposal restrictions).
323. See Drilling Permit Order, supra note 313, at 12–14.
324. In re Rubicon, 670 So. 2d at 482.
325. Blackett v. La. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 506 So. 2d 749, 755 (La. Ct. App.
1987).
326. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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doctrine that the LOC has little or no duties under the Natural Resources
Article.327
CONCLUSION
Even strong home rule must yield to significant state interests that create
real conflicts. State interests in uniformity, the prevention of waste, the
protection of correlative rights, and implications to the rule of capture make
limitations on local authority to regulate oil and gas operations necessary.
But the spirit of the movement that led to home rule suggests that local
governments should have a meaningful voice in matters that impact their
local communities. A meaningful local voice not only requires a procedural
right to raise concerns, but also requires the state to listen and acknowledge
those concerns and to address reasonable concerns when appropriate.
Certainly, the state should not be obligated to address all local concerns in a
substantive manner before issuing a permit. The state would not be overly
burdened, however, by transparently conveying to the public how the state
addresses local concerns that it decides to address and its reasons for not
addressing other concerns that have been raised, particularly when at least
some local concerns may be addressed in a balanced manner that preserves
the state’s interest in the production of its resources.

327. “In Louisiana, courts are not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, but
there is a recognition in this State of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante.
Unlike stare decisis, this latter doctrine does not contemplate adherence to a
principle of law announced and applied on a single occasion in the past.” Doerr
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1970), overruled on other grounds by
Jagers v. Royal. Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 312 (La. 1973)). “Under the civilian
tradition, while a single decision is not binding on our courts, when a series of
decisions form a ‘constant stream of uniform and homogenous rulings having the
same reasoning,’ jurisprudence constante applies and operates with ‘considerable
persuasive authority.’” Id. (quoting James L. Dennis, Interpretation and
Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1993)). This doctrine of jurisprudence constante may encourage
relitigation until a “constant stream” of legal decisions forecloses a particular
argument. FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE–SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS § 4.1,
in 1A LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 50–51 (2005).

